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Part-Time Government 
KELLEN ZALE* 
Part-time government is the rule, not the exception, for cities in the 
United States. The vast majority of the 20,000 cities in the U.S.—eleven 
out of every twelve—are governed by part-time local legislatures. From 
small towns to major urban metropolises, the fate of cities collectively 
responsible for billions of dollars in public revenues and expenditures 
is determined by city council members who often volunteer their time 
for minimal pay and juggle public service with full-time outside 
employment.  
 
This Article contends that the part-time model has systematic 
implications for city power that have gone unrecognized. All things 
being equal, a part-time city council has less power, in terms of 
capacity, resources, and political capital, than a full-time city council. 
Where does that power go? On one hand, the diminished power of part-
time city councils may mean that power goes unexercised: ordinances 
that are never passed, city services that are never funded, 
intergovernmental agreements that are never entered into. On the other 
hand, the diminished power of part-time city councils may mean that 
power gets redistributed to other institutions, such as states, other city 
officials, other units of local government, and private actors, which 
exercise power in ways that may diverge from how that power would 
have been exercised by city councils.  
 
Recognizing these power dynamics leads to a further normative 
question: Is part-time government in American cities a problem? In 
mid-size and larger cities in particular, the question of whether city 
council should remain part-time is a recurring and often highly 
contentious issue. Drawing on political science and public 
administration scholarship, this Article offers a systematic assessment 
of the power dynamics of part-time city councils and develops a set of 
normative guideposts that can inform the often highly politicized 
debates about part-time government. By thinking more deeply about 
factors that lend legitimacy to city councils as decision-makers, such as 
the representation of a diversity of interests, democratic accountability, 
and local autonomy, as well as factors that may cut in the other 
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direction, such as concerns about efficiency, expertise, and 
metropolitan fragmentation, this Article makes a novel contribution to 
the local government literature and offers a framework to clarify and 
refine our intuitions about the connections between institutional design 
and city power. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Part-time government is the rule, not the exception, for cities in the United 
States.1 The vast majority of the 20,000 cities in the Unites States—eleven out 
of every twelve—are governed by part-time city councils.2 From small towns 
of a few hundred residents to major urban metropolises like Dallas and Phoenix, 
 
 1 This Article uses the term “cities” to refer generally to incorporated municipalities 
that are general purpose local governments. However, depending on state law, other 
designations may be used, such as village, borough, and town. Throughout this Article, I use 
the phrases “local legislature” and “city council” interchangeably as generic terms referring 
to the local legislative body in an incorporated place. Other labels may also be used to refer 
to this entity, such as “Board of Supervisors” or “City Commission.” 
 2 See, e.g., James H. Svara & Jennifer Claire Auer, Perspectives on Changes in City 
Government Structures, in 80 THE MUNICIPAL YEARBOOK 2013, at 17, 29 (2013) (“The vast 
majority of city councils have part-time members. Only 260 cities (8%) reported having full-
time members and another 45 have a combination of full- and part-time members. . . . This 
proportion of 1 in 12 cities with full-time members is fairly consistent across city population 
sizes . . . .”); H. GEORGE FREDERICKSON ET AL., THE ADAPTED CITY: INSTITUTIONAL 
DYNAMICS AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE 125 (Richard D. Bingham & Larry C. Ledebur eds., 
2004) (“The norm in American cities is to have part-time councils.”).  
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the fate of cities collectively responsible for billions of dollars in public 
revenues and expenditures is determined by city councils whose members 
typically volunteer their time for minimal pay and juggle public service with 
full-time outside employment.3 
The part-time model represents a remarkably persistent pattern across cities, 
despite vastly different populations, demographics, public needs, and 
resources.4 Furthermore, the part-time model has a remarkably sticky 
institutional design outcome: even as cities grow in size and diversity, and are 
faced with more numerous and complex policy problems, departures from the 
part-time model remain relatively rare.5  
A number of arguments can be made in favor of or against the part-time 
model as an institutional design choice. These range from concerns about its 
potential to limit elected office to only those who can afford to serve and 
potential impacts on the diversity of elected leaders;6 to questions about the 
representativeness of an institution whose members may need to regularly 
recuse themselves because of conflicts related to their outside employment;7 to 
 
 3 See THOMAS GINSBERG ET AL., PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS’ PHILA. RESEARCH 
INITIATIVE, CITY COUNCILS IN PHILADELPHIA AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES: WHO HOLDS 
OFFICE, HOW LONG THEY SERVE, AND HOW MUCH IT ALL COSTS 10 (Larry Eichel ed., Feb. 
2011), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2011/02/02/citycouncilphiladelphia  
majorcitiespdf.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/GSN2-W8HL].  
 4 See David M. Lawrence, Local Government Officials as Fiduciaries: The 
Appropriate Standard, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1993). 
 5 Cf. Kellen Zale, Compensating City Councils, 70 STAN. L. REV. 839, 871 n.152 
(discussing one recent example of an anomalous change in San Antonio, Texas). 
 6 See, e.g., Katie McKellar, Despite Political ‘Awkwardness,’ Salt Lake City Council 
Considering Giving Themselves a Pay Raise, DESERET NEWS (Nov. 27, 2018), 
https://www.deseretnews.com/article/900044102/despite-political-awkwardness-salt-
lake-city-council-considering-giving-themselves-a-pay-raise.html [https://perma.cc/ 
R3R2-PFPE] (“[T]he council’s work has evolved over the years and the argument could be 
made the current pay rate hasn’t kept pace with the demands of the job, and perhaps could 
block regular Joes from serving on the council if they can’t afford to take time away from 
their day jobs.”); Morgan Smith, Part-Time Legislature Can Create Financial Hardship, 
TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 14, 2013), https://www.texastribune.org/2013/02/14/part-time-
legislature-can-create-financial-hardshi/ [https://perma.cc/64MQ-RGCU] (“The state’s 
founders envisioned the part-time Legislature as a place where there would be no room for 
full-time politicians. Tying lawmakers to their districts for all but five months every two 
years would keep them connected to the constituents they had been elected to serve. But in 
the modern Legislature, the paltry pay that goes along with being expected to earn a living 
elsewhere can have the opposite effect—narrowing the ranks of potential office-holders to 
only those who can afford to do it full time.”). 
 7 See ANDREW STARK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 11 (2000) 
(discussing various remedies to address conflicts of interest and noting that recusal is “a 
relatively appropriate remedy for officeholders performing quasi-judicial functions, since in 
most cases one judge can easily replace another. But it remains ill-suited for those executing 
quasi-legislative responsibilities. As the legal scholar Peter Strauss puts it, recusal ‘may, by 
changing [a] commission’s balance, disturb an intended and legitimate political 
judgment . . . .’” (alteration in original)); Patricia E. Salkin, Crime Doesn’t Pay and Neither 
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the challenge of developing ethics rules that provide adequate disclosure and 
transparency about part-time lawmakers’ outside interests without imposing 
requirements that are so onerous that they become a deterrent to public service.8 
Conditions in growing mid-sized and larger cities, where there is a greater 
diversity of competing interests and more numerous and complex governance 
needs, further heighten concerns about the welfare consequences of a part-time 
local legislature, as evidenced by recurring and often highly contentious debates 
about the part-time status of city councils in these cities.9 
While political science and public administration literature has explored 
some aspects of the part-time model of governance, most prominently in the 
context of state legislatures,10 scholars have largely overlooked the question of 
whether the part-time model might have distributional consequences for city 
power. This Article is an attempt to remedy this oversight. I contend that the 
part-time model affects power dynamics in cities in ways that existing 
scholarship has not adequately grappled with.  
 
Do Conflicts of Interest in Land Use Decisionmaking, 40 URB. LAW. 561, 564 (2008) (noting 
that conflicts of interest rules for part-time local officials “can create havoc when a majority 
of the members of a board recuse themselves from participation and voting. For example, a 
recent news account from Aspen, Kentucky reported that all city council members, except 
the mayor, chose to excuse themselves from voting on critical land use applications, citing 
conflicts of interest.”). 
 8 See, e.g., George F. Carpinello, Should Practicing Lawyers Be Legislators?, 41 
HASTINGS L.J. 87, 100 (1989) (noting that in state legislatures, the “citizen-legislature ethos 
has proved a significant barrier to serious discussion and resolution of the lawyer-legislator 
conflict of interest”); Lawrence, supra note 4, at 2–3 (“In the great majority of local 
governments, the elected officials who run the government—the members of the city council, 
the town board, the county commission, the school board—are part-time officials. While 
they are elected officials, they are also active farmers, business people, professionals, and 
the like. They derive their principal income not from their elected positions but from their 
private sector occupations. . . . Often some of those local lawyers, business owners, or 
contractors will also be on the town’s governing board, and the question then arises: when 
can a town do business with one of its elected officials?”). 
 9 See, e.g., Nick Coltrain, Fort Collins Voters to Decide Whether City Council 
Members Should Get Full-Time Pay, FORT COLLINS COLORADOAN (Dec. 16, 2018), 
https://www.coloradoan.com/story/news/2018/12/17/city-council-pay-april-election-
fort-collins/2313667002/ [https://perma.cc/8J5E-P7QM]; McKellar, supra note 6; Steve 
Salvatori & Mike Allen, City Council Salary: The Job Is Part-Time; Let the Voters Decide, 
SPOKESMAN-REV. (Apr. 17, 2016), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2016/apr/17/the-
job-is-part-time-let-the-voters-decide/ [https://perma.cc/6FDL-TS44]; Rob Turner, 
Time for Sacramento to Create a Full-Time City Council, SACRAMENTO BEE (July 30, 2016), 
https://www.sacbee.com/opinion/california-forum/article92418737.html [on file with 
Ohio State Law Journal].  
 10 See, e.g., PEVERILL SQUIRE & GARY MONCRIEF, STATE LEGISLATURES TODAY: 
POLITICS UNDER THE DOMES 65–73 (2d ed. 2015) (discussing the part-time model and trends 
in the professionalization of state legislatures). 
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All things being equal, a part-time city council has less power—in terms of 
capacity, resources, and political capital—than a full-time city council.11 Where 
does that power go? On one hand, the diminished power of part-time city 
councils may mean that power goes unexercised: ordinances that are never 
passed, city services that are never funded, intergovernmental agreements that 
are never entered into.12 On the other hand, the diminished power of part-time 
city councils may mean that power is redistributed to other institutions, such as 
states, other city officials, other units of local government, or private actors, 
each of which exercising power in ways that may diverge from how that power 
would have been exercised by city council.13 
The recognition that the part-time model produces power vacuums and 
redistributes power away from city councils invites a further normative 
question: How much power should city councils have? In part, the answer 
depends on one’s view of the role of city councils: Are they more likely to be 
sites of small-scale civic engagement and valuable laboratories of democracy, 
or sources of unnecessary layers of regulation, prone to policymaking that 
imposes spillovers and undercuts statewide uniformity concerns? Judgments 
about council members are also relevant: Are local legislators uniquely well-
positioned to act on matters of local import, or do they pose a risk of being well-
intentioned but underqualified, drawn from a limited pool of candidates, many 
of whom may have personal interests at stake due to their outside employment? 
Answering these questions is no simple task: they form the basis of much 
of the foundational literature of local government law. While much more could 
be written about each of these issues, a comprehensive reckoning of all of the 
policy and legal implications of the part-time model is beyond the scope of this 
project. The more modest goal of this Article is to hone in on how the part-time 
model impacts the power of city council vis-à-vis other institutional actors, and 
why those power dynamics matter. Drawing on political science and public 
administration scholarship, this Article develops a set of normative guideposts 
that can inform the often highly politicized debates about part-time government. 
I suggest that by focusing on factors that lend legitimacy to local legislatures as 
decision-making entities, such as the representation of a diversity of interests, 
democratic accountability, and local autonomy, as well as factors that may cut 
in the other direction, such as concerns about efficiency, expertise, and 
metropolitan fragmentation, we can develop a set of normative criteria by which 
to judge the part-time model. If we want to prioritize efficiency and expertise, 
and to provide a check against metropolitan fragmentation and electoral 
disinterest, then a part-time city council would seem to be a rational institutional 
design choice: the fact that power may be unexercised by a part-time council or 
redistributed to other institutional actors who better serve these values is a 
 
 11 Power in this sense means something different than formal legal authority. See infra 
Part II.A.  
 12 See infra Part II.A. 
 13 See infra Part II.B. 
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normatively desirable outcome. Conversely, if we are more concerned with 
local decision-making reflecting values of democratic accountability, 
representing a diversity of interests, and enhancing local autonomy, then a part-
time city council is more problematic, since it may result in a power vacuum 
and redistribution of power away from the very institution that can effectuate 
those values. 
While a core concern of local government law is the distribution of power—
between cities and states, among local governments, and between local 
governments and private interests14—and the public administration literature on 
the internal structures of local governments is voluminous,15 scholars have 
given less attention to how these two doctrinal domains interact. This Article 
aims to fill this gap in the literature by providing both a comprehensive, 
descriptive account of how part-time city councils can create power vacuums 
and redistribute power, as well as advancing a set of normative claims about 
how to respond to these power dynamics. In doing so, the Article makes a novel 
contribution to the growing body of legal scholarship that grapples in important 
ways with how internal structures of local government shape legal and policy 
outcomes.16 
 
 14 The literature on these issues is vast. Two of the foundational pieces of literature 
examining local government power are Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The 
Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1990), and Gerald E. Frug, 
The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1105–09 (1980). 
 15 See generally FREDERICKSON ET AL., supra note 2; MORE THAN MAYOR OR 
MANAGER: CAMPAIGNS TO CHANGE FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA’S LARGEST CITIES 
(James H. Svara & Douglas J. Watson eds., 2010) [hereinafter MORE THAN MAYOR OR 
MANAGER] (presenting a series of case studies about cities that have recently enacted charter 
changes to their form of government); JAMES H. SVARA, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, TWO 
DECADES OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN AMERICAN CITY COUNCILS (Sept. 2003), 
https://wanty.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/NLC-City-Councils.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/B7T3-XARZ] [hereinafter SVARA, TWO DECADES]; Susan MacManus, The 
Resurgent City Councils, in AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS: DIRECTIONS FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY 166 (Ronald Weber & Paul Brace eds., 1999) (providing a taxonomy of 
structures and operations of city councils); Kimberly L. Nelson & James H. Svara, Form of 
Government Still Matters: Fostering Innovation in U.S. Municipal Governments, 42 AM. 
REV. PUB. ADMIN. 257 (2012) (analyzing what effect the choice of a mayor-council or 
council-manager form of local government has on innovation). 
 16 See generally Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564 
(2016); Christopher S. Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance, 
Political Parties, and Election Law, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 363 (2013); Clayton P. Gillette, 
Expropriation and Institutional Design in State and Local Government Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 
625, 628 (1994); Noah M. Kazis, American Unicameralism: The Structure of Local 
Legislatures, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1147 (2018); Ethan J. Leib, Local Judges and Local 
Government, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 707, 711 (2015); Daniel B. Rodriguez, 
Localism and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627 (2001); David Schleicher, I Would, but I 
Need the Eggs: Why Neither Exit nor Voice Substantially Limits Big City Corruption, 42 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 277 (2011); Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak 
Cities? On the Power of Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542 (2006) 
[hereinafter Schragger, Strong Mayors]; Zale, supra note 5. 
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This Article’s focus on the power dynamics of the part-time model is also 
valuable because it moves the debate away from the often-ideological rhetoric 
over citizen legislators versus professional politicians to the more pragmatic 
context of distribution of power in governance systems. When the debate over 
part-time government is viewed through the former lens, as it so often is,17 the 
focus is often on individuals, not institutions.18 While there will certainly still 
be differences of opinion about how much power institutions should have vis-
à-vis each other, evaluating the part-time model through the lens of institutional 
power not only provides a more doctrinally sound foundation for policy debates 
among scholars, but may also foster more civically productive dialogues among 
community members and their elected officials. 
A few preliminary remarks about the scope of this project are warranted. 
First, a baseline assumption of this Article is that city councils, as the 
policymaking bodies for cities, have power that can be exercised in ways that 
matter. Although various background principles of state law, such as narrow 
conceptions of home rule authority, state preemption doctrines, and tax and 
expenditure limitations directly or indirectly limit the legal authority of cities, 
city councils still have extensive regulatory and policymaking authority over 
issues that matter, from infrastructure to economic development to social 
welfare.19  
Relatedly, it might be asked why focus on part-time city councils, when 
there are other sites of governance, from state legislatures to county 
commissions to mayors and judicial officers, whose part-time statuses also 
implicate institutional power dynamics. In part, this Article’s focus on city 
councils responds to a gap in the literature. Although a nascent resurgence of 
scholarship in local government law provides valuable insights into the local 
 
 17 See, e.g., Terrence T. McDonald, $40K Pay Raise for Jersey City Council Members? 
Councilman Suggests Doubling Salaries, JERSEY J. (Apr. 16, 2014), https://www.nj.com/ 
hudson/index.ssf/2014/04/jersey_city_councilman_suggests_100_salary_increase_fo
r_council_members.html [https://perma.cc/CK76-39E2]; Taylor Stevens, Salt Lake City 
Council Considers Changes to Its Own Pay for the First Time in Nearly Four Decades, SALT 
LAKE TRIB. (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2018/11/28/salt -
lake-city-council/ [https://perma.cc/7Z6C-NWFF]; Samantha Ye, Petitioners Aiming to 
Get City Council Full-Time Pay, ROCKY MOUNTAIN COLLEGIAN (Oct. 24, 2018), 
https://collegian.com/2018/10/petitioners-aiming-to-get-city-council-full-time-pay/ 
[https://perma.cc/5VN8-ZTX7].  
 18 See Johhny Kauffman, Low Pay in State Legislatures Means Some Can’t Afford the 
Job, NPR (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/01/09/508237086/low-pay-in-state-
legislatures-means-some-cant-afford-the-job [https://perma.cc/K8A3-DXN9] (quoting 
Neil Malhotra, professor of political science at Stanford University) (“There’s very, very few 
working class people in legislatures. This might have something to do with why a lot of 
legislation does not seem very friendly towards working class people.”).  
 19 See infra Part II.A. 
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executive,20 local administrative agencies,21 and local judicial officials22 (and 
there is a significant body of legal and political science scholarship on state 
legislatures, some of which grapples with the part-time nature of those 
institutions),23 city councils remain a particularly understudied institutional 
actor.  
Furthermore, focusing on the implications of the part-time model in the 
context of city councils offers a relatively standardized measure of comparison. 
A significant percentage of U.S. cities do not have an independently elected 
executive,24 but almost ninety percent have democratically elected city councils, 
which have broad governing authority and a set of foundational, baseline 
responsibilities that are fairly standardized across cities, such as budgeting, 
overseeing public employees, and responding to infrastructure needs.25 And 
while there is significant variation in the full-time versus part-time status of 
county commissions, both across states and within individual states, as noted at 
the outset, the vast majority of cities in the United States utilize part-time city 
councils.26 
Finally, in focusing on the connection between institutional design and city 
power, I am mindful that numerous other factors determine the power of city 
councils, from differences in the scope of home rule authority to the fiscal health 
of a city to the individual personalities of council members,27 and that city 
 
 20 See generally Jeffrey R. Henig, Mayoral Control: What We Can and Cannot Learn 
from Other Cities, in WHEN MAYORS TAKE CHARGE 19, 20 (Joseph P. Viteritti ed., 2009); 
William DeSoto et al., Power, Professionalism, and Independence: Changes in the Office of 
the Mayor, 38 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 156, 156–64 (2006); Elisabeth R. Gerber & Daniel J. 
Hopkins, When Mayors Matter: Estimating the Impact of Mayoral Partisanship on City 
Policy, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 326, 326–39 (2011); Schragger, Strong Mayors, supra note 16. 
 21 See Davidson, supra note 16, at 569–70. 
 22 See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to 
Private Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 419 (2009); Leib, supra note 16, at 713; Richard 
H. Underwood, Part-Time Prosecutors and Conflicts of Interest: A Survey and Some 
Proposals, 81 KY. L.J. 1, 5–7 (1992). 
 23 A majority of state legislatures are considered part-time. See Full- and Part-Time 
Legislatures, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 14, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/about-state-legislatures/full-and-part-time-legislatures.aspx [https://perma 
.cc/N8P2-2NZQ] (indicating that ten states have full-time state legislatures; twenty-six 
states have hybrid state legislatures (defined as two-thirds of a full-time job); and fourteen 
states have part-time state legislatures (defined as one-half of a full-time job)). 
 24 See infra note 51 (discussing the council-manager form of government). 
 25 See Forms of Municipal Government, NAT’L LEAGUE CITIES, https://www.nlc.org/ 
forms-of-municipal-government [https://perma.cc/9QXF-NJLY]. 
 26 See infra Part II.A.2. 
 27 See DOUGLAS YATES, THE UNGOVERNABLE CITY: THE POLITICS OF URBAN 
PROBLEMS AND POLICY MAKING 10 (1977) (“[T]o say that x holds y amount of power is not 
to give an adequate account of how he uses or fails to use that power to influence or control 
a particular decision.”); see also James H. Svara, The Embattled Mayors and Local 
Executives, in AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS: DIRECTIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
139, 140 (Ronald E. Weber & Paul Brace eds., 1999) (noting that constraints on local 
officials include “the weakness of cities in the federal system, disparity of resources in 
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councils are but one part of any calculus regarding city power.28 But this makes 
it even more important to understand how different factors impact city power. 
Analyzing how the internal structures of local government institutions affect 
power relationships not only contributes to a more analytically complete 
understanding of local governments, but can also help us adopt substantive 
policies that align with the capacities of our institutions—or change those 
institutions so that they have the necessary capacity to effectuate substantive 
policies.29 Especially as cities increasingly become sites of policy innovations 
and act as “laboratories of democracy” with regard to issues ranging from 
campaign finance to public health to environmental protection, it is important to 
examine the structural dynamics that operate on the institutions that enact these 
policies. 
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part II provides an overview of part-time 
city councils, beginning with a primer on the positive features of city councils 
as an institution and their roles in local governance. This Part then turns to 
unpacking what is meant by the label “part-time” as applied to city councils and 
analyzing why the part-time model is such a prevalent one in cities. Part III first 
develops a descriptive framework of the power dynamics of the part-time 
model, beginning with an analysis of the tradeoffs the part-time model makes in 
terms of legislative capacity, institutional resources, and political capital, and 
then develops a taxonomy of how the diminished power of part-time city 
councils can produce power vacuums and redistribute power to other 
institutions. Part IV explores the normative implications of these power 
dynamics. A brief conclusion follows in Part V. 
II. CITY COUNCILS AND THE PART-TIME MODEL 
Part II.A begins with a descriptive account of city councils, highlighting 
their organizational features and role in local governance. Part II.B turns to 
unpacking the meanings of “part-time” versus “full-time,” and analyzing why 
 
metropolitan areas, restricted resources, and rampant pluralism in the local political 
process”) [hereinafter Svara, Embattled Mayors]. 
 28 See B. GUY PETERS, INSTITUTIONAL THEORY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONALISM 184 (3rd ed. 2012) (“[I]nstitutions are the variables that explain political 
life in the most direct and parsimonious manner, and they are also the factors that themselves 
require explanation.”); Ronald D. Hedlund, Organizational Attributes of Legislatures: 
Structure, Rules, Norms, Resources, 9 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 51, 87 (1984) (“[O]rganizational 
characteristics are important features of a legislature because they define the situation in 
which legislative activity takes place, structure legislative behavior and activity, and 
establish the ways in which legislatures operate. . . . The impact of such organizational 
factors has been seen in both direct and indirect ways . . . .”). 
 29 See Vivien Lowndes, New Institutionalism and Urban Politics, in THEORIES OF 
URBAN POLITICS 91, 92 (Jonathan S. Davies & David L. Imbroscio eds., 2009) (discussing 
the “new institutionalism” school of political science, which “does not take political 
institutions at face value [and] instead . . . takes a critical look at the way in which they 
embody values and power relationships”). 
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the part-time model is such a prevalent institutional design choice for city 
councils.  
A. A Primer on City Councils 
Types of Local Governments. At the broadest level, local governments fall 
into two categories: general purpose governments and special purpose 
governments.30 The former consists of cities and counties,31 while the latter 
covers a vast range of entities, ranging from school districts to river authorities 
to hospital management districts.32 The two main types of general purpose local 
governments, cities and counties, are formally distinguished by the incorporated 
status of the former and the unincorporated status of the latter.33 Formally 
referred to as “municipal corporations,” cities are created by an act of 
incorporation initiated by residents.34 Counties are directly created by the state 
as administrative units.35 
 
 30 See Definitions: Local General Purpose Governments, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/cspan/govts/20120301_cspan_govts_def_3.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/QA6X-RSFS]; Definitions: Local Special Purpose Governments, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/newsroom/cspan/govts/20120301_cspan_ 
govts_def_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/VPS4-3L2V]. 
 31 See Definitions: Local General Purpose Governments, supra note 30. Other general 
purpose local governments include towns, townships, boroughs, and parishes; these forms 
of government are only found in some states. Id.  
 32 Cities 101—Types of Local Government, NAT’L LEAGUE CITIES, https://www.nlc 
.org/resource/cities-101-types-of-local-governments [https://perma.cc/2GQS-8ND7]; 
see 1 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 2:4 (3d ed., rev. 2019). 
 33 MCQUILLIN, supra note 32, § 2:07:10. 
 34 Id. In addition to cities, the U.S. Census includes villages, boroughs (except in New 
York and Alaska), and towns (except in New England and the upper Midwest) as types of 
municipal corporations in the total count of incorporated places. DARRYL T. COHEN ET AL., 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION TRENDS IN INCORPORATED PLACES: 2000 TO 2013, at 5–
6, 13 (Mar. 2015), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/ 
2015/demo/p25-1142.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3S4-M6RF]. For purposes of brevity, this 
Article uses the generic term “city” to refer to all types of municipal corporations. 
 35 Counties are considered to be more direct agents and political subdivisions of the 
state and thus are more constrained in both their legal powers and their institutional design 
arrangements than cities. See, e.g., Curtis v. Eide, 244 N.Y.S. 2d 330, 332 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1963) (“[C]ounties are involuntary subdivisions of the state created for the most part for 
convenience and for more expeditious state administration.”). However, some states have 
granted home rule powers to counties somewhat analogous to those granted to cities, and 
some counties have embarked on innovative policymaking outside the scope of their 
traditional duties. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. 
L. REV. 931, 994 (2010). In some ways, counties are more complicated institutional entities 
than incorporated municipalities and are worthy of further study. See id. (“[W]e know very 
little about the political economy of county government. . . . [C]ounty governments wear 
several distinct hats. They serve as the only general purpose local government for 
unincorporated areas, the second level of general purpose local government for incorporated 
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There are over 19,000 municipal corporations in the United States, the 
majority of which are small places with fewer than 5000 residents.36 Thus, 
despite the common connotation of a city as a dense, highly populated, urban 
place, most places with the legal designation of a city look more like what most 
people would refer to as a suburb or small town. However, even though most 
cities are small cities, the majority of the U.S. population lives in larger cities: 
75% of Americans live in cities of 10,000 or more residents,37 and roughly 60% 
of Americans in incorporated places live in cities with more than 50,000 
residents.38 
The State-Local Relationship. All local governments, whether counties, 
cities, or special purpose districts, are considered creatures of the state.39 There 
is no equivalent to the Tenth Amendment for local governments: local 
governments are considered political subdivisions of the state, and the state has 
broad power to shape, control, and even eliminate them.40 This top-down view 
of local government has meant that local power has traditionally been viewed 
narrowly: unless explicitly authorized by the state, local governments have been 
presumed not to have the power to act.41  
However, the value of local autonomy has long been recognized, and most 
states grant significant autonomy to local governments, both through specific 
grants of power to local governments and through the broader principle of home 
rule. Home rule refers to local self-government that results from the delegation 
of power from the state to local governments to regulate municipal affairs 
without requiring a specific grant of authority from the state for each act of local 
regulation.42 Home rule is not automatic: if state law provides for home rule, for 
a city to take advantage of it, that city typically must meet a minimum 
 
areas, administrative subdivisions of state government, and bureaucratic units for the 
delivery of federal services.”). 
 36 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2012 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS—ORGANIZATION (Sept. 
2013), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2012/econ/gus/2012-governments.html (click 
on Table 7: Subcounty General-Purpose Governments by Population-Size Group and State: 
2012) [on file with Ohio State Law Journal]. 
 37 FREDERICKSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 3. 
 38 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 34, at 3. 
 39 See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (“Municipal corporations 
are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of 
the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them. . . . The number, nature 
and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which 
they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State.”). 
 40 Id. at 178–79. 
 41 This view of limited local autonomy is also reflected in Dillon’s Rule, which provides 
that municipal corporations possess and can exercise only the following powers: those 
expressly granted, those necessarily implied by the powers expressly granted, and those 
essential to accomplish the purposes of the corporations. See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE 
REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 327 (8th ed. 
2016). Under Dillon’s Rule, doubts about existence of power are resolved against the 
municipality. See id. 
 42 Id. at 330. 
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population requirement as well as adopt a city charter through a majority vote 
of its residents.43 
The parameters of home rule vary, depending both on the type of home rule 
authority granted under state law and on how courts interpret the scope of the 
authority. Under legislative home rule, local governments are delegated broad 
authority to act unless the state specifically prohibits local action.44 While local 
governments have a broad presumption of autonomy under this type of home 
rule, the state can choose to preempt local action on any matter.45 In these states, 
the legal question in home rule cases is typically whether the state has implicitly 
preempted local action.46  
Another type of home rule is known as imperio home rule. In an imperio 
home rule system, local governments retain the authority to act on “municipal 
affairs” only.47 As a result, cities in imperio home rule states have authority over 
a narrower range of affairs than cities in legislative home rule states.48 However, 
if a matter is determined to be exclusively municipal in an imperio home rule 
state, then the normal rules of preemption are inverted: the local government 
action cannot be preempted by conflicting state law.49 In these states, the legal 
question in home rule cases typically centers on is the definition of “local”: some 
imperio home rule states interpret local affairs very broadly, while others 
construe it more narrowly, such that local governments are left with only a 
narrow area in which to legislate.50 
Structures of City Government. In addition to being distinguished by 
whether they have home rule authority, cities also differ in their internal 
organizational structures. Forms of local government vary both in how power is 
distributed internally between elected and appointed officials, as well as in how 
power is distributed among elected officials. The vast majority of cities use one 
of two organizational structures: the mayor-council system or the council-
manager system.51  
 
 43 Id. 
 44 See, e.g., WENDY H. GRIDLEY, OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM’N STAFF, MUNICIPAL 
HOME RULE (Jan. 2010), https://www.lsc.ohio.gov/documents/reference/current/memberso
memberson/128municipalhomerule.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4PB-V88K] (discussing home 
rule). 
 45 See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 41, at 348. 
 46 See Lauren E. Phillips, Note, Impeding Innovation: State Preemption of Progressive 
Local Regulations, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2225, 2234–35 (2017) (discussing implied 
preemption). 
 47 See St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 467–68 (1893) (establishing the 
concept of imperio home rule). 
 48 See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 41, at 347. 
 49 See id. at 348. 
 50 Id. at 350. 
 51 See DeSoto et al., supra note 20, at 158 (“Ninety-two percent of municipal 
governments in the United States today have one of [these] two forms of 
governments . . . .”); Nelson & Svara, supra note 15, at 259. Other forms of government that 
are more infrequently used are the commission form, town meeting, and representative town 
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In the mayor-council form of government, used in approximately one-third 
of all cities,52 there is a separation of powers between the city council, which 
has legislative authority, and the mayor, who is separately elected and vested 
with executive and administrative powers.53 The council-manager system, in 
contrast, vests all governmental authority—legislative, executive, and 
administrative—in the city council.54 The council in this system delegates its 
administrative authority to an appointed city manager who is tasked with the 
day-to-day administration of city government and implementation of policies 
enacted by the council.55 
Council-manager systems emerged as part of the early twentieth century 
Progressive reform movement, in an attempt to depoliticize local government 
and professionalize public administration.56 Because the council-manager 
 
meeting. See Forms of Municipal Government, supra note 25 (describing these forms of 
government). In a commission form of government, the city is governed by an elected 
commission, which holds all legislative and executive authority and has no elected executive 
or appointed professional manager. Id. Each member of the commission is responsible for a 
specific aspect of city governance (such as fire, police, or public works). Id. In a town 
meeting form of government, all eligible voters make decisions about policy directly, and in 
a representative town meeting form of government, residents elect a large number of their 
fellow residents to serve as selectmen who vote at town meetings. Id. Although the council-
manager and mayor-councils are distinguished formally as described herein, some public 
administration scholars have suggested that, in practice, many cities use elements of both 
systems, such as mayor-council cities that appoint chief administrative officers who serve in 
a role much like a city manager. See, e.g., FREDERICKSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 18 
(analyzing the changes in forms of municipal governments and suggesting that fewer cities 
fit the traditional mold of council-manager or mayor-council and “[m]ost American cities 
are now best described as adapted”); DeSoto et al., supra note 20, at 158 (summarizing recent 
research suggesting the “traditionally clear distinction between mayor-council and council-
manager systems is eroding”). 
 52 The mayor-council system is used most frequently in small cities and large cities, 
and less frequently in mid-sized cities, which tend to use the council-manager system. See 
MORE THAN MAYOR OR MANAGER, supra note 15, at 8–10 (providing tables showing the 
distribution of governmental forms across municipalities of various populations). 
 53 See id. at 7–8 (“In contrast to the council-manager form in which the council has 
authority over the manager, the mayor in the mayor-council form is a separate and 
independent executive.”). 
 54 Id. at 4. 
 55 Id. at 7; see also LEAGUE OF ARIZ. CITIES & TOWNS, WHAT ALL NEWLY-ELECTED 
LOCAL OFFICIALS NEED TO KNOW 34 (June 2018), https://www.azleague.org/Archive 
Center/ViewFile/Item/185 [https://perma.cc/R583-Z4GQ] (describing the role of the 
city manager in a council-manager system: “The manager is generally given the power to 
appoint and remove all employees, to draft the annual budget for submission to the council, 
to supervise and coordinate the day-to-day operations of the various departments and to 
present policy alternatives to the council.”). 
 56 Another legacy of the progressive reform movement in cities is non-partisan 
elections; in both council-manager and mayor-council forms of government, elections often 
are non-partisan: almost seventy percent of cities have non-partisan elections. See Elmendorf 
& Schleicher, supra note 16, at 385 (discussing problematic aspects of non-partisan 
elections). 
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system is intentionally designed to remove politics from governance, it trades 
accountability for efficiency: decisions about policy implementation are made 
by a professional city manager, who may bring efficiency to that decision-
making process but who is not directly accountable to voters.57 
In cities with mayors, the mayor may be characterized as either the strong 
mayor or weak mayor variety. These labels are not judgments about mayoral 
effectiveness but simply refer to the level of “political power and administrative 
authority” the mayor has been granted pursuant to the city charter.58 Strong 
mayors tend to be associated with the mayor-council form of city government 
and weak mayors with the council-manager form, but there is no necessary 
correlation.59 In a strong mayor system, the mayor is an independently elected 
official who typically has authority to supervise city agencies and oversee 
personnel, as well as a significant amount of discretion over budgetary decisions 
and veto power over council legislation.60 In cities with a strong mayor, 
separation of powers most closely mirrors that of federal or state government:61 
while the city council may disagree with how the mayor is administering (or 
failing to administer) policies enacted by the council, council has limited 
authority to interfere with the mayor’s decisions over personnel or the day-to-
day administration of city departments.62 
In the weak mayor system, the mayor may be independently elected or may 
be chosen from among city council members and largely serves a ceremonial 
role as the head of the city.63 The mayor may have full voting rights on city 
council or may only have power to break a tie;64 and the council, not the mayor, 
appoints department heads and has primary control over the city budget.65 
 
 57 See Alan Ehrenhalt, The Mayor-Manager Conundrum, GOVERNING STATES & 
LOCALITIES (Oct. 2004), http://www.governing.com/topics/mgmt/Mayor-Manager-
Conundrum.html [https://perma.cc/YXL2-GR3Q] (pointing out the challenges a city 
faces in trying to design a system that promotes efficiency and accountability equally: “It 
can hire a manager to replace wasteful political patronage with non-partisan administration, 
but in doing that it gives up the benefits of having highly visible political leadership. Or it 
can choose a strong mayor, and get the leader it is looking for. But as often as not, that brings 
in an element of managerial cronyism and politically tainted policy decisions.”). 
 58 Mayoral Powers, NAT’L LEAGUE CITIES, https://www.nlc.org/mayoral-powers 
[https://perma.cc/5EBP-8L9J]. 
 59 COLO. MUN. LEAGUE, COLORADO MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT: AN INTRODUCTION 12 
(2013), https://www.cml.org/issues/government/municipal/.../forms-of-municipal-
government/ [https://perma.cc/P4VP-EJUC] (noting some council-manager cities 
severely limit the position of mayor).  
 60 Mayoral Powers, supra note 58. 
 61 See id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See Forms of Municipal Government, supra note 25. 
 64 See, e.g., Functions of City Council, CITY OF CENTER, TEX., https://www.center 
texas.org/city-council/functions-city-council [https://perma.cc/6MHL-CY4A] (“The 
mayor is recognized as the head of the city government for ceremonial and emergency 
purposes but is not a voting member of the Council except to break a tie.”). 
 65 See COLO. MUN. LEAGUE, supra note 59, at 13. 
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Furthermore, in a weak mayor system, which is often correlated with a council-
manager system, there is no traditional separation of powers: the mayor 
typically has minimal executive powers and may simply share legislative power 
with the council (if she is a voting member).66 And while the council delegates 
administrative authority to the city manager, the city council retains the ability 
to overrule that authority, and thus may be potentially more involved in the day-
to-day administration than would be permitted in a mayor-council system.67 
Role of City Councils. As noted above, unlike at the state and federal levels 
of government, there is no constitutionally mandated separation of powers at the 
local level: city councils perform both legislative and non-legislative 
functions.68 For example, city councils in both council-manager and mayor-
council forms of government commonly act as quasi-judicial decision-making 
bodies on land use matters, such as rezonings, special use permits, and 
subdivision applications.69  
As the elected legislative body of cities, city councils have primary 
responsibility for setting city policy through the enactment of local legislation.70 
Traditionally, this has meant enacting laws related to the allocation of public 
 
 66 See Forms of Municipal Government, supra note 25. 
 67 See COLO. MUN. LEAGUE, supra note 59, at 13. 
 68 The structure of council-manager cities underscores this point: as noted above, in 
such cities, all governmental power is held by the city council. See 1 JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW § 9:7 (West 2017) (noting that under its plenary legislative authority, 
state legislatures may, but need not, create separate branches of local government by statute). 
The exact contours of separation of powers at the local level vary from state to state. See 
Zale, supra note 5, at 852–53 (discussing how states vary in their approach to separation of 
powers at the local level). 
 69 See Zale, supra note 5, at 852–53. 
 70 See, e.g., City Council, CITY OF LEXINGTON, VA., http://lexingtonva.gov/gov/  
city_council.htm [https://perma.cc/GUV9-TKJV] (“The City Council is the legislative 
and policy-making body of the city.”); COLO. SPRINGS, COLO., CHARTER art. III, § 3–10(a)–
(b) (2010), http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/coloradospringsforward/mailings/  
57/attachments/original/CityOfColoradoSpringsCharter.pdf?1417735165 [https://per 
ma.cc/4N32-UVUK] (“All legislative powers of the City shall be vested in the Council, 
except as otherwise provided by law or this Charter. . . . Except as otherwise set forth herein, 
whenever an executive or administrative function or duty shall be required to be performed 
by ordinance, the same shall be performed by the executive branch and not by the legislative 
branch.”). Although policymaking authority is vested in city councils, and the local executive 
(the mayor in a mayor-council system or the city manager in a council-manager system) is 
tasked with implementing policies, the line between policymaking and administration can be 
porous. See, e.g., Roles and Responsibilities of Local Government Leaders, MUN. RES. 
SERVS. CTR., http://mrsc.org/Home/Explore-Topics/Governance/Offices-and-Officers/ 
Roles-and-Responsibilities.aspx [https://perma.cc/3MBU-NUZN] (“Mayors, county 
executives, city managers, and staff do not make policy decisions. However, they have strong 
influence on the policy-making process and its resultant decisions. For example, they 
propose budgets, oversee staff-led studies and analyses related to proposed policies, and 
make policy recommendations to councils.”).  
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goods, such as education, land use, and infrastructure.71 But city councils, 
particularly in home rule cities, have broad authority to enact a wide range of 
public health, safety, and welfare measures.72 In response to the needs and 
demands of residents—and in response to inaction by state and federal 
lawmakers—councils in cities large and small have enacted policies on a wide 
range of issues that go beyond the traditional municipal focus on roads and 
schools, and encompass issues ranging from environmental regulation to 
consumer protection to election law reforms.73  
In addition to setting policy—which council accomplishes not only by 
passing ordinances but also through a range of other policy-related actions, such 
as adopting the annual budget (which sets fiscal priorities), making decisions 
about city contracting and entering into intergovernmental agreements, and 
appointing members of administrative commissions—city councils also 
perform other duties. Some of these responsibilities are mandated by state or 
federal law, such as ensuring the city’s compliance with election rules.74 Other 
duties are political, rather than legal: for example, a significant part of a council 
member’s role is providing constituent services.75 Constituent services refer to 
the expectation that council members or their staff will be available to address 
the individualized needs and concerns of constituents, with respect to everything 
from responding to complaints about trash pickup times to assisting residents 
with permit applications.76 Empirical surveys indicate that constituent services 
are a significant and time-consuming part of a council member’s job, occupying 
as much as one-third to one-half of the total time members spend on council-
related work.77 
 
 71 See KAREN M. KAUFMANN, THE URBAN VOTER 19 (2004) (describing the decisions 
of local lawmakers as primarily allocational in nature: “who will receive how much and at 
the expense of whom”). 
 72 See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing home rule cities’ broad powers). 
 73 See Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 
1165 (2018) [hereinafter Schragger, American Cities] (discussing policymaking by local 
governments that has sparked preemptive responses from state governments). 
 74 See, e.g., Elections, CITY OF WATAUGA, TEX., https://www.cowtx.org/826/ 
Elections [https://perma.cc/B5DF-PFXK] (“The City of Watauga is a Home Rule 
municipal government and operates under a Council-Manager form of government. . . . City 
elections are conducted in accordance with the Texas Election Code . . . each year.”). 
 75 See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972) (stating that constituent 
services “are performed in part because they have come to be expected by constituents, and 
because they are a means of developing continuing support for future elections. Although 
these are entirely legitimate activities, they are political in nature rather than 
legislative . . . .”). 
 76 See Joshua Bone, Stop Ignoring Pork and Potholes: Election Law and Constituent 
Service, 123 YALE L.J. 1406, 1411 (2014) (“The term ‘constituent service’ involves a set of 
relationships between individuals and their representatives that are often personal, 
idiosyncratic, and hidden from public view.”). 
 77 See SVARA, TWO DECADES, supra note 15, at 11–12 (presenting survey results on 
how much time council members reported spending on constituent services in proportion to 
overall time spent on council-related activities and noting that constituent services take up 
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To provide a more complete picture of the legal powers and duties of city 
councils, Table 1 below provides an overview of the various functions 
performed by city councils, as well as the role (if any) of other institutional 
actors with regard to specific functions. How much of the council’s overall 
agenda each of these functions occupies necessarily varies by city, depending 
not only on the scope of the city’s legal authority (in particular, whether it is a 
home rule city), but also on the size of the city, the staff support, the level of 
involvement of the mayor and other government officials, as well as 
idiosyncratic differences among council members. However, the first three 
functions listed in Table 1—adoption of an annual budget, enacting ordinances, 
and constituent services—are the core functions of any local legislature. 
It is also important to recognize that some functions described below have 
additional layers of granularity not captured in this tabular summary. For 
example, the category of “enacting local ordinances” includes a vast range of 
possibilities. Many local ordinances can be described as “nuts and bolts” 
ordinances which simply keep the city operational, such as ordinances setting 
fees for use of city recreational facilities, establishing rules for city procurement 
processes, clarifying vesting requirements for public employee pension benefits, 
or updating address numbering for the street grid. Other local ordinances look 
more like administrative decisions and may affect only a few individuals or even 
just a single resident or property owner; this is particularly true in the land use 
context, such as with rezoning decisions.78 Other ordinances may have broader 
ramifications, not only for the city adopting them, but also in terms of shaping 
the public policy debate in other cities, as well as at the state and federal levels, 
such as the adoption of anti-smoking ordinances in cities in the 1990s,79 or the 
living wage ordinances being adopted in cities today.80 
While acknowledging that there is more complexity to city council powers 
than can be captured in a tabular summary, the following table nonetheless 
offers a snapshot of the typical responsibilities of city councils, as well as a 
comparative summary of other institutional actors with whom particular 
 
“a larger share of the time spent on the job of council member in medium-sized and large 
cities” in particular).  
 78 See Eve Byron, Missoula Gives Initial Nod to Emergency Zoning for Some 
Townhome Projects, MISSOULIAN (Apr. 24, 2019), https://missoulian.com/news/local/ 
missoula-gives-initial-nod-to-emergency-zoning-for-some-townhome/article_d5df3b 
95-11f0-5080-9871-eeefd4c6cf39.html [https://perma.cc/ARE5-UEQ8] (discussing an 
instance of a land use ordinance targeted at a handful of property owners). 
 79 See INST. OF MED., SECONDHAND SMOKE EXPOSURE AND CARDIOVASCULAR 
EFFECTS: MAKING SENSE OF THE EVIDENCE 113 (2010) (“[D]uring the 1990s state and local 
governments across the country enacted an increasing number of more restrictive bans, 
including bans on smoking in most workplaces in some states.”). 
 80 Inventory of US City and County Minimum Wage Ordinances, UC BERKELEY  
LAB. CTR., http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/minimum-wage-living-wage-resources/ 
inventory-of-us-city-and-county-minimum-wage-ordinances/ [https://perma.cc/PQ6S 
-LNGJ] (“Before 2012, only five localities had minimum wage laws; currently, 46 counties 
and cities do.”). 
1004 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 80:5 
responsibilities may be shared or alternatively held by. I will return to this table 
in Part III, as it will be helpful in thinking through instances when the 
diminished power of a part-time city council might result in particular city 
council powers being unexercised versus being redistributed to other actors.  
 
Table 1: Powers and Duties of City Councils 
 
Powers and Duties of City Councils Roles of Other Institutional Actors 
Adoption of annual budget81 In mayor-council cities, the mayor typically 
submits an initial budget draft and may have 
veto over the council vote.82 In council-
manager cities, the manager typically 
submits an initial budget draft.83 
Enactment of local ordinances, 
resolutions, and/or motions in 
furtherance of public health, safety, 
welfare (i.e., legislative exercise of 
police powers)84 
Ordinances may be proposed by the council 
itself, or by the mayor, city staff, residents, 
interest groups, etc.85 
Constituent services86 Other elected executives (for example, 
mayors) are also typically expected to 
perform constituent services.87 
 
 81 Adoption of an annual budget is often the major responsibility of a city council: in 
developing and adopting an annual budget, the city council makes a wide range of policy 
decisions, such as determining which city-provided services will be maintained, increased, 
diminished, or eliminated; how much funding various city departments and the public 
employees working in them will receive; and setting the rates for sales, property, and other 
taxes (if authorized under state law). See COLO. MUN. LEAGUE, supra note 59, at 41. 
 82 See COMM. OF SEVENTY, HOW CITY COUNCIL WORKS 15–16 (Jan. 2015), 
https://seventy.org/uploads/files/84252017213333599-how-city-council-works-guide.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FF4M-2NVX]. 
 83 See COLO. MUN. LEAGUE, supra note 59, at 11. 
 84 The scope of local legislative authority to enact ordinances varies, depending on 
whether the city has home rule authority or not. In home rule cities (sometimes referred to 
as charter cities), local legislative authority is generally fairly broad, subject only to the 
limitations of the state’s home rule; in non-home rule cities (sometimes referred to as non-
charter cities) where Dillon’s Rule applies, local legislative authority is typically limited to 
only those powers that have been specifically authorized by the state. See BRIFFAULT & 
REYNOLDS, supra note 41, at 327. 
 85 See, e.g., Functions of City Council, supra note 64. 
 86 City Councils, NAT’L LEAGUE CITIES, https://www.nlc.org/city-councils 
[https://perma.cc/6VCG-EM22] (noting constituent services as one of several possible 
responsibilities of local government). 
 87 See, e.g., Rick Rojas, His Home Flooded, the Port Arthur Mayor Puts His City First, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/17/us/harvey- 
port-arthur-mayor.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-
heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/QR2H-NRSV] In the weeks after Hurricane Harvey, the role of the Port 
Arthur, Texas mayor greatly expanded. 
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Powers and Duties of City Councils Roles of Other Institutional Actors 
Appointment, termination, and 
general supervision of city 
manager88 
While mayor-council cities typically do not 
have a city manager, some cities have 
adopted a hybrid form of government 
(mayor-council with a city manager, often 
called an administrator). In these cities, 
appointment and supervisory authority over 
the administrator may be shared between 
council and mayor.89 
Decisions about land use, planning, 
and/or zoning90 
Certain types of land use decisions 
(variances, conditional uses, subdivisions, 
etc.) may be delegated to administrative 
bodies, such as planning and zoning boards. 
Final decisions may or may not require city 
council approval.91 
Holding of regular meetings and 
public hearings92 
Not applicable. 
 
Normally the job of mayor is part-time, requiring only one white button-down shirt 
embroidered with his name and the city logo. Lately, his mother has been washing that 
shirt every morning. Mr. Freeman has spent his days racing around the city, lobbying a 
visiting senator for federal aid one moment, sitting next to a woman sobbing onto his 
shoulder the next. He has focused on practical matters like restoring trash pickup, 
reopening schools and finding homes for displaced families.  
Id.  
 88 See, e.g., City Manager, CITY OF SARATOGA, CAL., https://www.saratoga  
.ca.us/DocumentCenter/View/1381/City-Manager [https://perma.cc/GEP3-PCXA] 
(explaining that the Saratoga City Council has the power to appoint, oversee, and remove 
city manager); City Manager, CITY OF BUDA, TEX., https://www.ci.buda.tx.us/104/City-
Manager [https://perma.cc/D2L6-BZGL] (specifying that city manager is appointed by 
Buda City Council for an indefinite term and is removable by city council). 
 89 See COLO. MUN. LEAGUE, supra note 59, at 10 (discussing this hybrid dynamic). 
 90 As noted above, some land use decisions, such as rezonings, may be considered 
legislative actions and are enacted through the adoption of an ordinance (and thus technically 
are a sub-category of the broader “enactment of ordinances” category above). Other land use 
decisions, such as variances, are considered quasi-judicial or administrative actions. See 8A 
EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25:249 (3d ed., rev. 2019). 
 91 See, e.g., Maria Nagle, Zoning Board Recommends Approval of Permit for New Tesla 
Bloomington Center, PANTAGRAPH (July 17, 2019), https://www.pantagraph.com/ 
news/local/govt-and-politics/zoning-board-recommends-approval-of-permit-for-new 
-tesla-bloomington/article_8e6ca5b2-baae-5263-af9d-8d88be770c74.html [https:// 
perma.cc/E4US-G2HK] (discussing a city where even a unanimous vote by the zoning 
board requires council approval). 
 92 See, e.g., COLO. SPRINGS, COLO., supra note 70, § 3–60(a)–(b) (“The Council shall 
meet at least once a month in legislative session, and the Council shall prescribe the time and 
place of its legislative sessions and the manner in which special meetings thereof may be 
called.”). 
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Approval of city contracting93 May be subject to review and/or approval by 
other governmental authorities or elected 
officials (for example, state or local 
auditors, subject-specific state agencies, 
labor relations boards, etc.).94 
Authority over decisions regarding 
real and personal city property, 
including acquisition, disposition, 
and the exercise of eminent domain95 
Not applicable. 
Establishment of property tax rate 
and proprietary public utility rates96 
State law may establish limitations on 
property tax rates;97 state law or interlocal 
agreements may establish other 
requirements with regard to public utility 
rates.98 
Issuance of municipal bonds99  State law or the city charter may require 
voter approval for the issuance of municipal 
bonds.100 
 
 93 See, e.g., CRESTON, IOWA, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17.02(5) (2006), 
https://www.crestoniowa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/457/CHAPTER-17---COUNCIL 
[https://perma.cc/2DVV-7JFH] (describing city council’s contracting authority). 
 94 See, e.g., Jay Kolls, Lakeland Mayor Calls City Council ‘Dysfunctional,’ State 
Auditor Asked to Review City Finances, KSTP 5 EYEWITNESS NEWS (Apr. 16, 2019), 
https://kstp.com/news/lakeland-mayor-calls-city-council-dysfunctional-state-auditor-
asked-to-review-city-finances/5319641/ [https://perma.cc/GDT5-9J8X] (concerning a 
city-wide petition asking the state auditor to audit the city’s finances related to a contracting 
issue). 
 95 See, e.g., City Councils, supra note 86.  
 96 See, e.g., Utilities, CITY OF LIVINGSTON, TEX., https://www.cityoflivingston-
tx.com/154/Utilities [https://perma.cc/GE93-4JPW] (“Rates for all [municipal utility] 
services are established by municipal ordinances which are adopted and approved by the 
City Council.”). 
 97 See, e.g., N.Y. ST. OFF. COMPTROLLER, UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL TAX 
LIMIT 2, https://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/finreporting/cities.pdf  [https://perma 
.cc/3E2Y-C32X] (“The New York State Constitution places a legal limit on the authority 
of cities, as well as counties and villages, to impose property taxes. Statutes intended to 
enforce these constitutional provisions require the Comptroller to withhold certain local 
assistance payments if taxes are levied in excess of a municipality’s tax limit.”). 
 98 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-2 (West 2018) (“[A]uthority shall be vested in the 
North Carolina Utilities Commission to regulate public utilities generally, their rates, 
services and operations . . . .”). 
 99 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 59 (West 2019) (city council has the authority to 
issue and refund bonds). 
 100 See, e.g., Kirk Pinho, Birmingham Voters Overwhelmingly Reject $57.4 Million 
Parking Deck Bond, CRAIN’S DET. BUS. (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.crains 
detroit.com/real-estate/birmingham-voters-overwhelmingly-reject-574-million-park 
ing-deck-bond [https://perma.cc/LL9U-VZZN] (detailing voters’ rejection of a proposed 
Birmingham bond measure); HOUSTON, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. IV, § 1 (1979), 
https://library.municode.com/tx/houston/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=CH_AR
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Service on local, regional and/or 
inter-jurisdictional entities101 
Not applicable. 
Adoption of legislative agenda 
identifying policy goals and interests 
to be lobbied for at the state and/or 
federal level 
May be formal or informal; often a 
cooperative effort with mayor; may involve 
cooperation with other local 
governments.102 
Appointment and/or approval of 
appointments for designated city 
positions103 
Council itself may appoint certain 
designated positions (typically high-level 
city employees, such as the city attorney or 
members of city boards and commissions), 
or it may confirm candidates for such 
positions appointed by the mayor or 
manager.104  
 
TIVPOBOBUBASISTAGSTEQ [https://perma.cc/G9YG-332U] (“No bonds shall be 
issued for any purpose, except for the purpose of making permanent improvements, which 
shall not exceed one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) in any one year, and for the 
purpose of re-funding bonds of the City of previous issues, unless an election be duly ordered 
by the Mayor and City Council, and if at said election a majority of the vote polled shall be 
in favor of creating such debt, it shall be lawful for the City Council to make the issuance of 
bonds as proposed in the ordinance submitting the same at the election so held, but if a 
majority of the vote polled shall be against the creating of such debt, it shall be unlawful for 
the City Council to issue the bonds.”). 
 101 See, e.g., City Council Regional Boards & Subcommittees, CITY OF ENCINITAS, 
http://encinitasca.gov/Government/City-Council-Regional-Boards-Subcommittees 
[https://perma.cc/VR2C-C8FX] (council members serve on in-house standing committees, 
various regional boards and committees, and other committees and task forces). 
 102 See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) About City Government, CITY OF 
TUCSON, https://www.tucsonaz.gov/gov/frequently-asked-questions-faq-about-city-
government [https://perma.cc/5RKE-K3ML] (“There are some issues with which Mayor 
and Council must approach a higher form of government, such as the Arizona State 
Legislature or Congress, to get resolved. Consequently, Mayor and Council form a 
Legislative Agenda to advocate solutions for local problems.”). 
 103 See, e.g., DE SOTO, MO., GOVERNMENT CODE, § 115.080, https://ecode360.com/ 
28314154 [on file with Ohio State Law Journal] (council appoints a city manager, city clerk, 
and city treasurer). 
 104 Compare About Houston, CITY OF HOUSTON, TEX., https://www.houstontx.gov/  
abouthouston/citygovernment.html [https://perma.cc/DBG7-VNJN] (describing one of 
Houston’s city council’s roles as “confirming the mayor’s appointments”), with COLO. 
SPRINGS, COLO., supra note 70, § 3–10(e) (describing the requirement that the Colorado 
Spring’s city council “appoint by the concurring vote of a majority of its members a City 
Auditor”). 
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Creation and/or abolishment of local 
administrative commissions and 
boards105 
Council and/or mayor may have authority to 
create and/or abolish administrative 
commissions.106 
Approval of intergovernmental 
agreements107 
Subject to state law requirements;108 the 
other unit(s) of local government (i.e., the 
city, the county, and/or special districts) 
entering into the interlocal agreement 
typically also must approve any interlocal 
agreement.109  
Authority over boundary change 
and/or local government 
formation110 
Annexations, deannexations, dissolutions, 
formation of special districts, and other 
boundary changes may be subject to 
approval by city council.111 State law may 
impose additional requirements.112 
Election-related duties Subject to requirements of state law; 
typically includes the duty to set election 
 
 105 See, e.g., Boards and Commissions, CITY OF SALISBURY, N.C., https://salisbury 
nc.gov/Government/City-Council/Boards-and-Commissions [https://perma.cc/ZW7H 
-ZKLV] (council creates and appoints local boards and commissions). 
 106 See, e.g., Brett Knese, Hannibal City Council Creates New Roadway Commission, 
WGEM NEWS (Aug. 6, 2019), https://wgem.com/2019/08/06/hannibal-city-council-
creates-new-roadway-commission/ [https://perma.cc/9YML-89HN] (“[Hannibal City] 
council approved an ordinance unanimously . . . to create a new roadway 
commission . . . .”). 
 107 See, e.g., Atlanta City Council Approves Intergovernmental Agreement Allowing for 
the Transformation of Philips Arena, ATLANTA CITY COUNCIL (June 20, 2017), 
http://citycouncil.atlantaga.gov/Home/Components/News/News/162/175 [https://per 
ma.cc/3LW4-BGY5]. 
 108 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-20-105(1) (West 2019) (“Local governments 
are authorized and encouraged to cooperate or contract with other units of 
government . . . for the purposes of planning or regulating the development of land 
including, but not limited to, the joint exercise of planning, zoning, subdivision, building, 
and related regulations.”). 
 109 See, e.g., Robert Catanese, Savannah City Council Approves SPLOST 7 Agreement, 
Project List, WTGS FOX 28 (July 22, 2019), https://fox28media.com/news/local/ 
savannah-city-council-approves-splost-7-agreement-project-list  [https://perma.cc/ 
GY9Q-L7NE] (“Council passed the intergovernmental agreement with the county . . . .”). 
 110 See, e.g., ASHLAND, OR., CHARTER art. I, § 3 (1970), https://www.ashland.or.us/ 
SIB/files/Charter/ARTICLE%201%20Name%20and%20Boundaries.pdf  [https://per 
ma.cc/UBT3-RSXD] (council or voters can modify city boundaries). 
 111 See, e.g., Aaron Sanderford, Omaha City Council Approves Annexation Package that 
Adds 4 Subdivisions, 1,000 People, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (July 17, 2019), 
https://www.omaha.com/news/metro/omaha-city-council-approves-annexation-pack 
age-that-adds-subdivisions-people/article_4ae06aae-6ff3-51b2-8463-e68127e63ef8 
.html [https://perma.cc/8PJW-9UVA]. 
 112 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 709.02(A) (West 2019) (“The owners of real estate 
contiguous to a municipal corporation may petition for annexation to a municipal 
corporation . . . .”). 
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dates, districts, polling locations, granting or 
extension of franchise.113 
Investigative powers114  Not applicable. 
Fulfill other duties pursuant to local, 
state, and/or federal law 
Local, state, and/or federal law may impose 
other duties on city councils, to perform 
alone or in conjunction with other 
institutional actors. 
B. Part-Time Versus Full-Time 
Part II.B begins by unpacking the meanings of “part-time” versus “full-
time” in the context of city councils, and then turns to a brief discussion of why 
the part-time model is such a prevalent institutional design choice for city 
councils. 
1. Defining Part-Time 
In addition to the structural features discussed above, cities can also be 
characterized by their use of a part-time or full-time city council.115 These labels 
may appear to be self-explanatory, but precisely defining the terms in this 
context is less than straightforward.116 Most cities do not officially designate 
council members as full-time or part-time; and in those that do, the label is rarely 
defined.117 Elected officials are typically not considered government 
 
 113 See, e.g., HOUSTON, TEX., supra note 100, at art. V, § 3 (“It shall be the duty of the 
City Council to establish the boundaries of districts covering the entire City for the purpose 
of electing District Council Members. Such boundaries shall be established by 
ordinance . . . .”). 
 114 See COMM. OF SEVENTY, supra note 82, at 13 (“[Philadelphia] City Council has the 
power to conduct special hearings, called inquiries or investigations, to gather information 
to aid its legislative work. A resolution authorizing an investigation must first be passed by 
a majority vote . . . .”). 
 115 Applying these labels to an institution serves as shorthand for the status of the elected 
officials serving in that institution: a part-time city council is part-time because the position 
of city council member is part-time. 
 116 See Full- and Part-Time Legislatures, supra note 23 (“It seems like an easy question: 
Which legislatures are full-time and which ones are part-time? But with 50 different formulas 
for designing a state legislature, it’s difficult to paint this issue in black and white.”).  
 117 Unlike other structural features of city government, which are typically clearly 
delineated in a city charter—such as the form of government as council-manager or mayor-
council or the designation of council elections as at-large or by district—the part-time or 
full-time status of city council members only rarely is officially designated by city charter or 
local ordinance. See, e.g., J. Edward Johnson, Dir. of Legislative Affairs for Columbus City 
Council, Employment Status of City Council Members, Presentation Before the City of 
Columbus Charter Review Committee Charter Review Commission 2 (2016), 
https://www.columbus.gov/uploadedFiles/Columbus/Elected_Officials/City_Council
/Charter_Review_Commission/2016_Committee/2016-1215%20Full%20time%20v 
.%20part%20time%20remarks.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y63Z-2XAB] (“Often times, when 
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employees,118 so importing definitions of the term from the employment law 
context does not neatly map onto the positions of city council members.119 
There is also no automatic correlation between the two structural forms of local 
government discussed above—the mayor-council form and the council-
manager form—and the part-time or full-time status of elected officials.120 
Furthermore, because individual cities differ in terms of population and 
demographics, there is no standardized prototype of a part-time council, but 
rather a continuum of institutional design arrangements that fall under the 
banner of “part-time.”121 
However, by surveying empirical data about the institutional design 
arrangements of different types of city councils, as well drawing on political 
 
looking at the cities where council members are part-time, the language is not informative 
as to the necessary time and attention required to be an effective local elected official.”). For 
example, of the ten most populous U.S. cities, only three have charter provisions defining 
the part-time or full-time status of the city council or council members. See HOUSTON, TEX., 
supra note 100, at art. VII, § 1 (“The Councilmen shall not be required to devote their full 
time to the duties of their offices.”); SAN DIEGO, CAL. CHARTER, art. III, § 12(f) (2018), 
https://docs.sandiego.gov/citycharter/Article%20III.pdf  [https://perma.cc/7SQU-88 
BM] (“Council members shall devote full time to the duties of their office and not engage in 
any outside employment, trade, business or profession which interferes or conflicts with 
those duties.”); SAN JOSE, CAL. CHARTER art. III, § 407 (2018), http://sanjoseca.gov/ 
DocumentCenter/View/85489 [https://perma.cc/M89F-E86W] (“The base salary shall 
be in an amount which takes into account the full time nature of the office and which is 
commensurate with salaries then being paid for other public or private positions having 
similar full time duties, responsibilities and obligations.”). 
 118 See, e.g., CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE §§ 2-152-140(b)–(c) (defining “[e]mployees” as 
“individuals employed by the City of Chicago, either full-time or part-time,” and separately 
defining “[e]lected officials” as “the mayor, city clerk, city treasurer, and aldermen of the 
City of Chicago”); Karen Murphy, County Commissioners: Full- or Part-Time?, 
TALLAHASSEE REP. (Apr. 25, 2017), http://tallahasseereports.com/2017/04/25/county-
commissioners-full-or-part-time/ [https://perma.cc/63S7-ZWD7] (noting that Florida 
county “commission positions are not specified as full- or part-time in any . . . [c]ounty 
charter, ordinance or Florida statute because the commissioners are not employees, they are 
elected officials”). 
 119 Furthermore, the part-time label does not have a consistent meaning in the 
employment law context. See, e.g., Part-Time/Full-Time Status, TEX. WORKFORCE COMM., 
https://twc.texas.gov/news/efte/part_time_full_time.html  [https://perma.cc/4WQE-
GKPB] (“Texas and federal laws leave it up to an employer to define what constitutes full-
time and part-time status within a company and to determine the specific schedule of 
hours.”). 
 120 See DeSoto et al., supra note 20, at 161. 
 121 In part because there is no single, absolute definition of “part-time,” there can be 
confusion about what the term means even among elected officials themselves. What one 
person believes is a part-time position, another may believe is full-time (or vice-versa), even 
when those people are members of the same city council. See Zale, supra note 5, at 856–57 
n.82 (describing conversations with Chicago aldermen concerning whether their positions 
were full- or part-time, in which “three indicated that the position was full-time; two 
indicated it was part-time; and one indicated it was part-time but with full-time hours”). 
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science literature about professionalism in state legislatures,122 it is possible to 
identify a set of four criteria that can be used to distinguish part-time positions 
from full-time ones: (1) compensation; (2) permissibility of outside 
employment; (3) formal time commitments; and (4) institutional resources.  
Compensation. Pay is often the clearest objective indicator of whether an 
elected office is considered full-time or part-time.123 In studies of state 
legislative professionalism, higher pay is one of the signifiers of professional 
state legislatures,124 and the more professional a state legislature is, the more 
likely it is to be considered a full-time legislative body.125 While pay for public 
sector employment is not necessarily comparable to private sector employment, 
relatively higher pay signals that the position is a “career” position, whereas 
lower pay provides a signal that legislators are expected to keep their outside 
employment (or have independent means to support themselves).126 While the 
salary amounts for council positions that are considered full-time vary 
 
 122 See Full- and Part-Time Legislatures, supra note 23 (using the indicia of 
professionalism to categorize state legislatures into full-time, hybrid, and part-time bodies). 
Professionalism is a proxy for full-time status used by political scientists studying state 
legislatures. See John R. Hibbing, Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study 
Them, in LEGISLATURES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES 37 
(Gerhard Loewenberg et al. eds., 2002) (noting that factors indicating legislative 
professionalism include “session length, member compensation, number of staff, other 
perquisites, general legislative resources, and committee structures”); Gary F. Moncrief, 
Recruitment and Retention in U.S. Legislatures, in LEGISLATURES: COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES ON REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES 59 (Gerhard Loewenberg et al. eds., 2002) 
(“[T]he concept of legislative professionalization remains a somewhat difficult one to 
measure precisely. For one thing . . . [there is a] distinction between the components that are 
directly related to the institution [such as session length] and those that are more related to 
the incentive structure of the individual [such as compensation].” (internal citations 
omitted)); Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 649 (“[P]rofessionalism may be difficult to define 
precisely, but one key operational definition concerns whether state legislatures are made up 
of professional politicians charged with the responsibility to meet regularly and to conduct 
legislative business as their principal avocation.”). 
 123 Lawmakers’ total compensation includes not only salary, but also non-salary 
benefits, such as per diem payments, expense accounts, and pension benefits. Because of the 
difficulty in gathering data on these non-salary forms of compensation and the enormous 
variation across municipalities in the availability of different types of compensation, 
compensation as used here refers to salary, with the recognition that salary does not 
necessarily reflect overall compensation. See Zale, supra note 5, at 860–61 (discussing non-
salary, as well as non-monetary, components of city council compensation, and the 
challenges in measurement and comparison created by such non-salary forms of 
compensation). 
 124 See id. at 855–56. 
 125 Id. at 856. 
 126 See Full- and Part-Time Legislatures, supra note 23 (noting that states in which 
legislators are well-paid and afforded large staffs usually require they spend eighty percent 
or more of the hours usually required for a full-time job). 
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considerably across cities,127 a nonscientific rule of thumb is that city council 
salaries at or above the city’s median income are more likely to be considered 
full-time positions, while those below that level are more likely to be considered 
part-time.128 
Permissibility of Outside Employment. Part-time city council positions 
typically permit council members to have outside employment, subject to 
conflict of interest rules and other limitations.129 In contrast, members of full-
time city councils are less likely to engage in outside employment, although 
outright bans on outside employment are rare.130 The permissibility of outside 
employment for part-time city council members reflects both expectations about 
the time and attention that they devote to their positions on city council, as well 
as the recognition that if outside employment were not permitted, only a limited 
pool of candidates could afford to serve in a part-time position with relatively 
low pay.131  
 
 127 For example, in San Antonio, which recently adopted a full-time model for its city 
council, the annual salary for the position is approximately $45,000, while in New York City, 
full-time city council member’s salary is almost $150,000 annually. See Zale, supra note 5, 
at 858–60, 869 n.142, 900 n.285 (discussing the reasons for salary disparities between city 
councils among the 100 most populous cities in the United States). 
 128 See id. at 859–60 (noting that a city’s median income is among the factors affecting 
city council compensation). 
 129 For example, some part-time city councils allow outside employment in the private 
sector, but do not permit outside employment in the public sector, known as dual office 
holding. See Patricia E. Salkin, Municipal Ethics Remain a Hot Topic in Litigation: A 1999 
Survey of Issues in Ethics for Municipal Lawyers, 14 BYU J. PUB. L. 209, 219 (2000) (“The 
issues surrounding dual office holding regularly arise in small, more rural municipalities 
where it can be difficult to recruit willing volunteers into public service. It can also arise 
where one person simultaneously holds two public sector jobs in an effort to earn a full-time 
salary.”). The permissibility of outside employment for council members may be governed 
by specific local ordinances or policies, or addressed through general conflict-of-interest 
rules. Conflict-of-interest rules, when they even exist at the local level, which is not as 
frequently as one might hope, are often developed and adopted as part of good government 
and public ethics reforms that are neither temporally nor substantively linked to the variety 
of other considerations that can give content to the part-time or full-time status of elected 
officials (i.e., compensation, staff support, etc.). See Vincent R. Johnson, Ethics in 
Government at the Local Level, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 715, 725–26 (2006) (“‘Few 
[municipalities] have enacted a code of ethics that provides a simple and comprehensive list 
of do’s and don’t’s for their officers and employees,’ let alone a more precise document 
stating obligations susceptible to legal enforcement.”). 
 130 See Johnson, supra note 129, at 725–26 (discussing how municipal codes of ethics 
rarely provide a bright-line test for whether conduct is permissible); Zale, supra note 5, at 
856–57 (discussing how Chicago aldermen are technically allowed to maintain outside 
employment, despite the position requiring full-time hours). 
 131 See Deborah L. Markowitz, A Crisis in Confidence: Municipal Officials under Fire, 
16 VT. L. REV. 579, 602–03 (1992).  
It may not be in local government’s best interest to exclude all individuals with relevant 
expertise from public service merely because that expertise may give rise to conflict of 
interest. In smaller towns, a municipality would have a particularly difficult time trying 
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Formal Time Commitments. In the state legislative context, the length of the 
legislative session is used as a proxy for the formal time commitments of state 
legislators; longer and more frequent sessions are correlated with full-time state 
legislatures, while shorter and less frequent sessions are correlated with part-
time ones.132 Unlike state legislatures, which may meet for only a few months 
of the year, but for full daily sessions during those months, city councils meet 
year-round, but typically for only a few meetings per month.133 A proxy for the 
formal time commitments of city council members therefore might be the 
average number and length of regular, special, and committee meetings attended 
per member per month.134 Councils that meet more frequently and impose 
greater committee obligations on their members are more likely to be 
characterized as full-time, while councils that meet less frequently and use 
committees to a lesser extent are more likely to be characterized as part-time.135  
However, it is important to recognize that formal time commitments, as 
measured by meeting and committee schedules, only represent part of the 
overall amount of time council members spend on council-related work. Council 
members typically must spend additional time in preparation for formal 
meetings by reviewing materials, meeting with staff, and holding informal 
 
to find volunteers for its boards if service required volunteers to sever all employment 
and business connections with the municipality. The goal of local government must be 
to strike a balance between encouraging broad participation by respecting the legitimate 
personal interests of public officeholders and preventing conflicts of interest and biases 
which could adversely influence the objective functions of government. 
Id. 
 132 See Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, How Much Should State Legislators Get Paid?, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 7, 2016), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-much-
should-state-legislators-get-paid/ [https://perma.cc/2NCG-4WJN] (“Some states with 
smaller populations, like Montana and New Hampshire, are ‘part-time’ legislatures, with 
shorter sessions and fewer constituents.”); Full- and Part-Time Legislatures, supra note 23 
(stating that full-time legislatures “generally spend more time on the job because their 
sessions are longer”). 
 133 See GINSBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 15 (finding, in a survey of fifteen city councils, 
the median number of weeks during the summer with no official business scheduled was 
only six); MacManus, supra note 15, at 175 (observing city councils for larger municipalities 
typically meet weekly, whereas councils for smaller municipalities may meet only monthly 
or bi-monthly). 
 134 Committees are regularly used by councils in cities of all sizes and forms of 
government, though committee use is somewhat higher in larger cities and in those that use 
the mayor-council form of government. See SVARA, TWO DECADES, supra note 15, at 26–27 
(citing statistics on committee use by city size and form of government and indicating that 
91% of large cities, 76% of medium cities, and 71% of small cities use committees).  
 135 See MacManus, supra note 15, at 175 (noting that larger cities, which are more likely 
to utilize full-time city councils, typically hold weekly meetings, while cities under 10,000 
residents in size, which are likely to almost uniformly use part-time city councils, hold 
bimonthly or monthly meetings, and that council meetings are also “longer in larger 
cities. The typical council meeting lasts two to four hours in over half of all cities, but four 
to eight hours in nearly one-fourth of the cities, mostly the larger ones”).  
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gatherings with the public and interest groups.136 In addition, as discussed in the 
previous Part, council members typically provide ongoing constituent services 
to residents.137 The amount of time spent on constituent services necessarily 
varies by individual council member and the particular needs of their 
constituents, but empirical data from surveys of council members, as well as 
abundant anecdotal evidence, indicate that constituent services are a significant 
and time-consuming part of a council member’s job, ranging from one-third to 
one-half of the total time council members spend on council-related work.138  
Institutional Resources. A final indicator of the part-time or full-time status 
of city councils is the extent of institutional resources provided to council 
members. These resources include the number of staff per council member, the 
budget given to council members to run their offices, and whether an office is 
even provided. While there is no set amount of institutional resources that 
delineate a part-time council from a full-time one, the greater the resources 
provided to the legislative body to support its operation, the more likely it is to 
 
 136 There may be temporary expansions in the role of local elected officials, such as after 
a disaster, during which a part-time position in city government becomes a de facto full-time 
one. See Rojas, supra note 87. 
 137 See SVARA, TWO DECADES, supra note 15, at 11 (presenting survey results on how 
much time council members reported spending on constituent services in proportion to 
overall time spent on council-related activities). 
 138 See id. Many members of part-time state and local legislative bodies would contend 
that when constituent services and other ongoing responsibilities are taken into account, their 
role is actually a full-time one. See, e.g., Getting Paid: Debating the Council’s Outside 
Income and Salaries, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Dec. 10, 2007), https://www.gotham 
gazette.com/economy/3738-getting-paid-debating-the-councils-outside-income-and-
salaries [https://perma.cc/9GMA-D5VJ] (quoting a city council member who reported, 
“We don’t work five days a week . . . . You go to church and you still deal with constituent 
service [sic].”); Liz Shepard, Counties Differ in How They Pay Board Members, TIMES 
HERALD (Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.thetimesherald.com/story/news/local/2014/12/  
06/counties-differ-pay-board-members/20014979/ [https://perma.cc/QF4G-ZR83] 
(quoting a part-time county commissioner: “I spend more time doing this job than I do my 
real job.”); see also SQUIRE & MONCRIEF, supra note 10, at 218 (“It is almost certainly the 
case that the general public overestimates the amount legislators are paid and underestimates 
the amount of work involved.”); John Aguilar, Aurora Voters Choose Whether to Give 
Elected Leaders a Pay Hike, DENVER POST (Apr. 17, 2017), 
https://www.denverpost.com/2017/04/17/aurora-voters-choose-elected-leaders-pay-
hike/ [https://perma.cc/SV5W-YGGS] (“Aurora Councilwoman Marsha Berzins said that 
although she and her council member colleagues are not classified as full-time employees, 
she still works 50 hours or so a week on city business. She said she had to give up her job 
working for an airline at Denver International Airport during her first year on council because 
she didn’t have time to do both jobs, even though the city’s charter stipulates that council 
members shouldn’t put more than 20 hours a week into the job. ‘I realized I couldn’t do 
justice to the citizens of Aurora and have another job. . . .’”); Smith, supra note 6 (“[F]or 
most members, the demands of [the Texas state legislature] aren’t quite limited to January 
through May in odd-numbered years [as the state officially dictates]. The needs of their 
constituents and the issues they must follow to make public policy don’t go away during the 
interim, nor do the campaigns they must orchestrate to stay in office.”). 
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be considered full-time.139 Conversely, the more limited the resources, the more 
likely the body is considered part-time.140  
The factors laid out above provide a set of criteria that can be used to 
designate a city council as either full-time or part-time. Theses labels are not 
meant to be talismanic; certain criteria, such as low levels of compensation and 
few institutional resources, may indicate that a particular council position is 
designed to be part-time, but these criteria may fail to reflect the actual full-time 
governing responsibilities and time commitments required of the position.141 
The criteria may also point in conflicting directions as to what the status of a 
particular city council is: for example, a council position with a salary at or near 
the city’s median income that still allows for outside employment might be 
categorized as full-time in some cities, but part-time in others.142 Furthermore, 
context is important: the same factors that might demarcate a council position 
as a part-time one in a major urban center—for example, a salary of $40,000 
and a single staffer for each member—might qualify it as a full-time position in 
a smaller municipality. But despite the lack of a bright-line demarcation 
between a full-time council and a part-time council, the criteria laid out above 
offer a way to give content to these labels. With this definitional framework in 
place, the next Part turns to the question of why so many cities utilize the part-
time model for their city councils.  
 
 139 See supra note 138. 
 140 Staff support for councils is typically lower in council-manager cities (across all 
sizes) than mayor-council cities because of the assumption that council can rely on the city 
manager and her staff for necessary support. See SVARA, TWO DECADES, supra note 15, at 
27–28. In contrast, in mayor-council cities, because of the separation of legislative and 
executive power between the council and mayor, councils in cities of all sizes are more likely 
to have staff support. See id. (presenting empirical data from a 2001 study of city councils 
indicating that 97% of city councils in large cities with the mayor-council form of 
government had council staff versus 80% of city councils in large cities with the council-
manager form of government; 61% of city councils in medium cities with the mayor-council 
form of government had council staff versus 42% of city councils in medium cities with the 
council-manager form of government; and 36% of city councils in small cities with the 
mayor-council form of government had council staff versus 23% of city councils in small 
cities with the council-manager form of government).  
 141 See GINSBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 10 (“In many of the cities, the official 
designations of ‘full-time’ and ‘part-time’ have become irrelevant for council members.”); 
MacManus, supra note 15, at 175 (citing statistics on the amount of time council members 
spend on council matters and noting that “in spite of the fact that a council position 
technically may be ‘part-time,’ it is closer to a full-time job for many”). 
 142 For example, in Philadelphia, the city council is paid a six-figure salary; however, 
because the city’s conflict of interest rules permit council members to retain outside 
employment (with some caveats), several council members maintain their private-sector, 
full-time jobs, resulting in ethical concerns and perception problems. See Chris Brennan, 
Despite Six-Figure Salary, City Council Still a Part-Time Job for Some, PHILA. ENQUIRER 
(Aug. 8, 2016), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/politics/20160809_Despite_six-
figure_salary__city_council_is_still_a_part-time_job_for_some.html [https://perma 
.cc/S4NN-7YLD] (reporting about the “perception problem” that outside employment 
creates in Philadelphia). 
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2. The Prevalence of the Part-Time Model 
As noted in the Introduction, the overwhelming majority of cities—eleven 
out of every twelve of the nearly 20,000 municipalities in the U.S.—utilize the 
part-time model for their city councils.143 And although the very largest of U.S. 
cities are more likely to have a full-time city council, the part-time model is 
otherwise the prevailing institutional design outcome across cities of all sizes, 
including growing mid-size and larger cities where it might not be expected.144  
This Part explores why the part-time model of city councils is so prevalent. 
Drawing on both public administration literature about local governance 
structures and political science research on legislative professionalism, this Part 
identifies several factors related to the objective characteristics of cities, 
subjective preferences of residents, and background settings of state law, which 
operate as drivers of the part-time model for city councils. Given the differences 
between individual cities and background principles of state law in different 
states, the relative weight of the factors discussed herein as an explanation for a 
particular city’s choice of the part-time model will necessarily vary. But taken 
together, they provide a cohesive, descriptive account of why the part-time 
model is the prevailing institutional design choice for city councils. 
Population and Demographics. The first explanation for the prevalence of 
part-time city councils is simply that the governance responsibilities of most city 
councils are limited due to the small size and homogeneous populations of most 
cities. As noted in Part II.A, although the term “city” may instinctively connote 
a major urban metropolis, in fact, the vast majority of cities are small 
incorporated places.145 According to the most recent available census data, of 
the 19,519 incorporated municipalities, almost half—9205—are cities with less 
than 1000 residents.146 Most of the remaining cities—7339—have less than 
10,000 residents,147 meaning nearly 85% of all municipalities are places with 
less than 10,000 residents.148 Of the nearly 20,000 cities in the United States, 
only a few hundred exceed 50,000 residents, and only 61 cities have populations 
over 300,000.149 
 
 143 Svara & Auer, supra note 2, at 29. 
 144 See id. (“Only 260 cities (8%) reported having full-time members and another 45 
have a combination of full and part-time members . . . .”). 
 145 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 36. 
 146 Id.  
 147 This total is based on the most recently available census data (2012), which indicates 
that 3584 municipalities have 1000–2499 residents; 2088 municipalities have 2500–4999 
residents; and 1667 municipalities have 5000–9999 residents. Id. 
 148 See id.; Sarah Gibb & Rodger Johnson, Growth in Small Town America, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU BLOG (May 21, 2015), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/  
random-samplings/2015/05/growth-in-small-town-america.html [https://perma.cc/ 
YS5J-Z64U] (making this calculation based on the underlying data cited above). 
 149 It is worth noting the distinction between the fact that the majority of cities are small 
incorporated places, but the majority of the U.S. population lives in larger incorporated 
places. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 36 (indicating that approximately 3.65 million 
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Not only is the population of most U.S. cities relatively low, but the 
residents of many cities are also often fairly homogeneous in terms of 
socioeconomic characteristics such as race, ethnicity, average income, and 
education levels.150 As a result, there is unlikely to be the diversity of interest 
groups vying for the time and attention of local lawmakers that would be seen 
in a major urban area.151 While there still may be issues that spark intense 
disagreements about local government decision-making even under these 
conditions—land use being a common example—the extent of conflict in many 
cities is limited by the relative homogeneity of residents.152 Furthermore, as a 
practical matter, in smaller cities, there is a proportionally smaller pool of 
individuals to run as candidates for city council.153 Thus, there may simply be 
not enough people who would be willing or able to serve in a full-time body.154  
Scope of Governance Authority. The governance responsibilities of local 
lawmakers are also limited by state law. How much authority cities have varies 
by state, as well as within states, depending on whether the city is a home rule 
 
people in the United States live in 9205 cities with populations of under 1000 residents, while 
51.1 million people live in 61 cities with populations greater than 300,000). 
 150 See J. ERIC OLIVER, DEMOCRACY IN SUBURBIA 71–72 (2009) (“Although the 
economic differentiation between central cities and suburbs is well known, what is not often 
recognized is how internally homogeneous many of these communities are . . . . American 
cities in general are highly stratified by income . . . . [M]iddle income cities hold a wide 
range of income groups, but richer cities tend to have only rich people and the poorest cities 
tend to have mostly poor people.”); Schragger, Strong Mayors, supra note 16, at 2576 (noting 
that “smaller, more homogeneous communities” often are able to use “technocratic” 
governance forms, such as part-time councils and professional city managers, in part because 
“those communities have found ways to insulate themselves from larger economic and 
demographic dislocations. As economic and demographic circumstances change, however, 
suburban municipalities will increasingly need political—not just technocratic—
governance.”). 
 151 See MORE THAN MAYOR OR MANAGER, supra note 15, at 6 (discussing how the 
council-manager form of government tends to align with the needs of “small, harmonious 
communit[ies]” because in smaller cities, the population is less likely to be “a collection of 
competing interests” and more likely to be a “community with shared interests”); Robert 
Cropf et al., St. Louis: Déjà Vu All over Again—Charter Reform Fails, in MORE THAN 
MAYOR OR MANAGER, supra note 15, at 266 (“[T]he larger the city, the more public services 
it provides. In other words, the scope and substance of the functional responsibilities of larger 
cities tends [sic] to be on the whole greater and more diverse than those of smaller ones.”). 
 152 See OLIVER, supra note 150, at 71 (discussing the lack of conflict in many small, 
homogeneous cities). 
 153 See Markowitz, supra note 131, at 603 (“In smaller towns, a municipality would have 
a particularly difficult time trying to find volunteers for its boards if service required 
volunteers to sever all employment and business connections with the municipality.”); How 
To: Reduce the Size of Council; Section 818 of the Borough Code, PA. ST. ASS’N BOROUGHS, 
http://boroughs.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/How%20to%20Reduce%20Number%20o
f%20Council.pdf [https://perma.cc/CE62-T55P] (describing a Pennsylvania law that 
allows municipalities that are unable to fill all the seats on their local legislative body to 
formally reduce the size of body). 
 154 Id. 
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city. While home rule cities have a relatively broad lawmaking authority, non-
home rule cities have only those powers that state law expressly gives them.155 
To gain home rule status, a city typically must have a certain minimum 
population and adopt a charter;156 smaller cities may fail to meet one or both of 
these qualifications. Thus, to the extent that a city is a non-home rule city whose 
legal authority is limited under state law, there simply may not be a need for a 
full-time city council, since state law limits the set of governing duties to be 
accomplished. 
Fiscal Constraints. Cities, arguably to a greater extent than other levels of 
government, operate in a severely fiscally constrained environment. Not only 
are they limited in their revenue-raising ability by numerous tax and expenditure 
limitations imposed under state law, but they also face competitive incentives 
to provide tax incentives to mobile capital.157 For small cities—and as noted 
above, most cities are small cities—fiscal constraints may loom especially large: 
annual budgets in such cities experience greater variances and are subject to 
more limitations on revenue raising under state law.158 While the salaries of a 
handful of city council members may not be a particularly large percentage of a 
city’s overall budget, for these types of smaller cities, the cost of full-time 
salaries and other benefits for elected officials may be a significant cost.159 The 
part-time model may also be perceived as offering cost savings not only because 
council members are paid less than full-time council members,160 but also 
because the part-time nature of the job is seen as cabining the ability of the city 
council to engage in activities that would expand government programs or 
services and thereby increase the overall tax burden of residents.  
Subjective Preferences of Residents. The underlying values associated with 
the part-time model—such as those associated with civic volunteerism, limited 
government, and fiscal restraint—also reflect the subjective preferences of 
 
 155 See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 41, at 327 (describing how Dillon’s Rule 
constrains the authority of non-home rule cities to those powers that are expressly granted or 
necessarily implied). 
 156 See id. at 330 (“[I]n many states, home rule extends only to some cities (usually the 
more populous ones) and counties (usually the most urbanized ones), not to all.”); Zale, 
supra note 5, at 863 n.105 (“[T]o assert home rule powers, typically a local government must 
enact a charter . . . .”). 
 157 See generally RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A 
GLOBAL AGE (2016) (discussing the constraints imposed on cities) [hereinafter SCHRAGGER, 
CITY POWER]. 
 158 John Rogard Tabori et al., Town of Univ. Park, Md., Presentation at the Annual 
Conference of the Mississippi Municipal League: Budget Planning and Economic 
Forecasting, A Small Town Perspective (June 29, 2011), http://www.mdmunicipal 
.org/DocumentCenter/View/31/Budget-Planning-and-Economic-Forecasting-FINAL 
?bidId= [https://perma.cc/74AF-QPEC] (noting that small towns often have limited 
taxation authority, which can lead to greater revenue instability). 
 159 See id. (describing labor as “the primary cost driver” of small town budgets). 
 160 There is wide variation, however, in pay across full- and part-time local legislative 
bodies, both by type (city council, county commission, etc.) and by size of the locality. See 
Zale, supra note 5, at 857.  
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many Americans. Polls consistently show that a majority of Americans believe 
“big government” is the greatest threat to the country.161 A central premise of 
the Republican platform is that smaller government is better government.162 
Even Democrats, who have been traditionally more supportive of an expansive 
role for the government, have joined the calls for less government.163 By its very 
design, the part-time model reflects these sentiments: by imposing fewer formal 
time commitments, providing low compensation, and maintaining an 
expectation that members will retain outside employment, the part-time model 
limits the amount of governing a city council will likely engage in.164 
Furthermore, governance in the form of a nonprofessional citizen legislature 
reflects longstanding sociopolitical concerns about government power in the 
 
 161 Noam Fishman & Alyssa Davis, Americans Still See Big Government as Top Threat, 
GALLUP (Jan. 5, 2017), http://www.gallup.com/poll/201629/americans-big-government 
-top-threat.aspx [https://perma.cc/VT6E-YQ56] (discussing a 2017 Gallup poll in which 
67% of those polled thought that “Big Government” was the country’s greatest threat; 26% 
of respondents indicated “Big Business” was the greatest threat; 5% indicated “Big Labor” 
was the greatest threat). 
 162 See Yoni Appelbaum, Trump Wants to Make Government Huge Again, ATLANTIC 
(Mar. 13, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/trump-govern 
ment-ethnocentrism/473538/ [https://perma.cc/AR5X-DBHS] (quoting three of the 
2016 Republican presidential candidates: “‘I will fight anyone who wants to expand 
government,’ Marco Rubio vowed. In Ohio, ‘We shrunk the government,’ John Kasich 
boasted. ‘Government is the problem!’ insisted Ted Cruz. ‘Here’s my philosophy. The less 
government, the more freedom. The fewer bureaucrats, the more prosperity.’”). 
 163 See, e.g., Mark Pazniokas & Keith M. Phaneuf, Malloy Warns of Need for 
Concessions, Smaller Government, New Aid Formulas, CONN. MIRROR (Jan. 4, 2017), 
https://ctmirror.org/2017/01/04/malloy-upbeat-yet-warns-of-labor-concessions-small 
er-government/ [https://perma.cc/MAE4-GKFU] (describing the 2017 State of the State 
speech by Connecticut’s Democratic governor as focusing on “how to further shrink state 
government, extract more concessions from unions on pension and health benefits, and better 
focus a smaller pool of state aid for education on the systems most in need”); see also John 
Buntin, Does Eric Garcetti Have a Big Enough Vision for L.A.?, GOVERNING STATES & 
LOCALITIES (Aug. 2014), http://www.governing.com/topics/mgmt/gov-eric-garcetti-
los-angeles-mayor.html [https://perma.cc/VK5W-J69K] (“Many Angelenos seem fed up 
with government and are not clamoring for more. ‘People think of California as liberal. 
We’re actually very libertarian,’ says [Los Angeles Mayor Eric] Garcetti. ‘I have to make 
the case to a committed liberally voting, but libertarian, skeptical electorate, that says, “You 
tell me why I need this stuff,” not, “Please get me this stuff.”’”). 
 164 In this sense, the part-time model can also serve as an anti-entrenchment device, since 
its limited power and limited pay may reduce the appeal of the position to those who would 
focus more on getting reelected than on lawmaking. See Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. 
Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400, 402 (2015); David L. 
Sollars, Institutional Rules and State Legislator Compensations: Success for the Reform 
Movement?, 19 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 507, 517 (1994) (“If a legislator views the job as a career 
rather than a temporary interlude, keeping the job becomes a paramount concern and many 
incentive problems arise for the members . . . [and] a vast amount of time and effort is spent 
in pursuit of reelection.” (citation omitted)). 
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United States.165 While full-time, professional legislatures may have advantages 
over citizen legislatures in terms of resources, expertise, and experience, full-
time legislatures can raise concerns about a “separate class” of career 
politicians.166 The part-time legislative model arguably can serve as a bulwark 
against such a separate class developing, by attracting “regular” citizens who 
are expected to maintain their prior careers, as opposed to those interested in 
government service as a full-time career.167 Part-time, nonprofessional, citizen 
governance, the argument goes, can serve “as a democratic check on 
government and [ensure] that government is responsive to the interests of the 
public.”168 The part-time model also appeals to norms in favor of public service, 
with many of those who hold part-time office at the local level conceding that 
the position may objectively impose time demands rising to a full-time 
commitment, but also viewing it as a way of giving back to the community.169  
 
 165 See, e.g., Bobby Jindal, Congress Should Be a Part-Time Job, HILL (Dec. 1, 2010), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/131361-congress-should-be-a-part-time-job 
[https://perma.cc/599C-RZ6P] (arguing that the “Founding Fathers envisioned that being 
a member of Congress would be a part-time job” and noting that at one time, “Pennsylvania’s 
state constitution even had a provision calling for members of the Legislature to ‘have some 
profession, calling, trade, or farm, whereby he may honestly subsist.’ Otherwise, they feared 
legislators would come to rely on politics as a career, and they would be unable to ‘preserve 
[their] independence.’”). 
 166 Studies of state legislatures have found that “the more professional the legislature, 
the less people approve of it . . . even though . . . contact between representatives and the 
represented increases with professionalization, as does policy responsiveness.” See SQUIRE 
& MONCRIEF, supra note 10, at 208.  
 167 See, e.g., Salvatori & Allen, supra note 9 (voicing the concerns of two former city 
council members over a proposed pay raise for the current council, who believed that 
“citizens want their council members to have real jobs, because it is one thing to pass 
legislation, but quite another to have to comply with it”); Linton Weeks, Hey Congress: Keep 
Your Day Jobs, NPR (Dec. 28, 2010), http://www.npr.org/2010/12/28/132294306/hey-
congress-dont-keep-your-day-jobs [https://perma.cc/8B9B-S5C5] (quoting a part-time 
Nevada state legislator, who said that, “unlike certain places that have full-time 
legislatures . . . in Nevada we have people in our legislature who are teachers, who run 
nonprofits, who are small-business people, are ranchers, all of whom give a diverse 
perspective on setting public policy for the state”); Peter Crispino, For Part-Time Elected 
Officials, Public Office Is a Juggling Act, PASADENA VOICE (Mar. 24, 2015), 
http://www.pasadenavoice.com/stories/for-part-time-elected-officials-public-office-
is-a-juggling-act,16427 [https://perma.cc/XK7E-N54Z] (“‘In some ways, I think [a part-
time position] keeps you grounded,’ [Maryland County Commissioner] Trumbauer 
continued. ‘Every day, I face the same struggles that many of my constituents face with 
family life or budget decisions and the day-to-day grind of a job . . . as opposed to a full-time 
politician, which by its very definition makes you different than everybody else.’”). 
 168 See Beth Nolan, Public Interest, Private Income: Conflicts and Control Limits on the 
Outside Income of Government Officials, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 57, 84 (1992) (“In general, the 
democratic goal of government in the public interest is served by citizen governance, while 
the concept of a permanent governing elite is antithetical to the principles of democracy.”).  
 169 See SVARA, TWO DECADES, supra note 15, at 14–15 (presenting data on reasons 
council members reported running for office and noting most report “service orientation” 
reasons, such as “to help a neighborhood, to address issues, and/or to provide leadership for 
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The force of subjective preferences also helps explain why the part-time 
model remains the prevailing institutional design choice even in larger cities. It 
might be expected that as cities grow in size and face more numerous and 
complex policymaking choices that require more time, attention, and resources 
from elected officials, a full-time city council would more effectively serve the 
public interest. But deeply held beliefs in subjective values about citizen 
legislatures and limited government can drown out objective factors that 
otherwise indicate that the part-time model is misaligned with the complex and 
numerous governance needs of larger cities.170 
Background Principles of State Law. As noted above, the prevalence of the 
part-time model stems in part from fiscal constraints imposed under state law as 
well as substantive limitations on the scope of local authority.171 But state law 
also operates in indirect ways to make the part-time model a likely institutional 
design choice for city councils. For example, permissive incorporation laws in 
many states set low population thresholds for the formation of new 
municipalities, making it likely that the types of cities that currently exist (and 
that are likely to be formed in the future) are the types of cities whose objective 
characteristics align with the part-time model for the reasons discussed 
above.172 The wide range of special purpose districts authorized under state law 
also makes it possible for cities of any size to be “minimal cities”: cities can 
outsource many traditional core government services, such as sanitation, 
stormwater management, and public safety, to special districts, and there often 
will be fiscal and legal advantages to doing so.173 When services are carved out 
to special districts, which have their own leadership and governing structures, 
 
some group”); see also Salvatori & Allen, supra note 9 (“Most cities have part-time councils, 
and service is considered a civic duty.”). But see Alvin D. Sokolow, Legislators Without 
Ambition: Why Small-Town Citizens Seek Public Office, ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 23, 23 
(1989) (finding that “personal and policy incentives, more than appeals to civic obligation, 
dominated the recruitment decisions and actions” of local elected officials in a small sample 
of cities). 
 170 The force of these subjective preferences also helps explain why some large states, 
such as Texas, continue to utilize the part-time model for their state legislatures. See Smith, 
supra note 6 (noting that although the founders of Texas envisioned a part-time legislature, 
where lawmakers would only meet during the legislative session for five months every other 
year and remain connected with their constituents and maintain outside employment the rest 
of the time, the modern reality is that “the demands of public office aren’t quite limited to 
January through May in odd-numbered years.” Despite this disconnect between the demands 
of the job and the part-time status (and pay), “[t]here hasn’t been a major move to raise 
lawmakers’ annual compensation since 1989” and “the political tides remain unlikely to 
shift”). 
 171 See Tabori et al., supra note 158 (noting that small towns often have limited taxation 
authority, which can lead to greater revenue instability). 
 172 See STEWERT E. STERK ET AL., LAND USE REGULATION 716–17 (2d. ed. 2016) 
(discussing permissive incorporation law regimes in states). 
 173 See generally Sara C. Galvan, Wrestling with MUDS to Pin Down the Truth About 
Special Districts, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041 (2007) (discussing the history and growth of 
special districts). 
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the burden on city lawmakers to oversee and make policy related to that subject 
area is correspondingly reduced, thereby making a full-time legislative body less 
necessary.174 Other state laws operate more directly to promote the part-time 
model of city councils, such as state laws which cap permissible compensation 
for local elected officials or that tightly prescribe the duties of local elected 
officials.175  
Background principles of state law also operate in subtle ways to contribute 
to the prevalence of the part-time model. For example, the legal status of cities 
as “creatures of the state” and the fact that city governments have traditionally 
been viewed primarily as service providers, and not as sites of policymaking, 
reinforce a view of cities as limited sites of governance, needing only limited 
forms of government.176 Even in larger cities with more heterogeneous 
populations, diversity of interest groups, and complex sets of policy problems, 
their perceived “smallness” (as compared to the state) may lead to continued 
support for the part-time model: if the state of Texas or Arizona can function 
with a part-time state legislative, then arguably smaller units of government, 
such as Dallas or Phoenix, even if they are major cities, should be able to do so 
as well. 
While part-time city councils are a prevalent and persistent outcome in cities 
for the reasons discussed above, the part-time model is not without tradeoffs. A 
range of arguments can be made regarding the part-time model when it is 
 
 174 Similarly, state laws that authorize privatization make it possible for cities to contract 
out for many core governmental services traditionally associated with city government. See 
generally Russell Nichols, The Pros and Cons of Privatizing Government Functions, 
GOVERNING STATES & LOCALITIES (Dec. 2010), https://www.governing.com/ 
topics/mgmt/pros-cons-privatizing-government-functions.html [https://perma.cc/YM 
V3-LZ7G] (discussing advantages and pitfalls for state and local governments contracting 
out tasks such as trash collection, road repair, and water management). 
 175 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 43, § 17B (West 2018) (limiting city council 
member salaries to $2000 for cities with populations less than 50,000 and $3000 for cities 
with populations over 50,000); Eugene Curtin, Is Bellevue Ready for a Full-Time Mayor?, 
BELLEVUE LEADER (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.omaha.com/sarpy/bellevue/is-bellevue-
ready-for-a-full-time-mayor/article_20c07619-9925-5686-813d-315e0926d664.html 
[https://perma.cc/KA2B-ZR2D] (“A debate likely to emerge in the new year is whether 
the City of Bellevue should declare the mayor’s job to be a full-time position, and whether a 
full-time mayor can be granted more power without running afoul of state laws that closely 
define the duties and privileges of mayors who head cities of the first class.”). In addition, 
some states have laws that limit how frequently a city charter may be changed, and these 
laws may also operate as a constraint on the ability of cities to make structural changes to 
their city councils. See, e.g., Clif LeBlanc & John Monk, Columbia Voters Reject Strong 
Mayor, STATE (Dec. 3, 2013), https://www.thestate.com/news/politics-government/ 
article13830737.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal] (referring to a South Carolina 
state law that “requires at least four years between referendums to change a city’s form of 
government”).  
 176 See SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 157, at 57 (“[T]he history of local 
government law in the states has been an ongoing effort to redefine, control, and limit city 
power, not expand it.”). 
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contested as an institutional design choice. These range from concerns about its 
potential to limit elected office to only those who can afford to serve and the 
impacts on the diversity of elected officials;177 to questions about the 
representativeness of an institution whose members may need to regularly 
recuse themselves because of conflicts related to their outside employment;178 
to the challenge of devising ethical rules that ensure adequate disclosure and 
transparency about part-time lawmakers’ outside interests without imposing 
requirements that are so onerous that they serve as a deterrent to public 
service.179 Conditions in growing mid-sized and larger cities, where there is a 
greater diversity of competing interests and more numerous and complex 
governance needs, may particularly raise concerns about the welfare 
consequences of a part-time city council.180 While much more could be written 
about each of these concerns, a comprehensive reckoning of all of the policy 
and legal implications of the part-time model is beyond the scope of this Article. 
The more modest goal here is to hone in on how the part-time model impacts 
the power of city council vis-à-vis other institutional actors, and why those 
power dynamics matter. The next Part develops a framework that can help 
clarify and refine our intuitions about what the part-time model means for local 
legislative power.  
III. THE POWER DYNAMICS OF PART-TIME CITY COUNCILS 
Part II provided an overview of what the part-time model for city councils 
looks like and why it is such a prevalent institutional design choice in cities. Part 
III turns to analyzing the largely unexplored question of how the part-time 
model shapes the power dynamics of local government. Part III.A begins by 
analyzing why part-time city councils have less power than full-time ones, in 
terms of institutional resources, legislative capacity, and political capital. Part 
III.B deepens the analytical framework by mapping out how the part-time model 
can both produce power vacuums and redistribute power away from city 
councils to other institutional actor. In the former situation, power is unexercised 
 
 177 See, e.g., Lauren Bishop, Should City Council Members Be Full-Time Employees? 
Thomas Says Yes, COLUMBIA MISSOURIAN (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.columbia 
missourian.com/news/local/should-city-council-members-be-full-time-employees-
thomas-says/article_3750a436-2e1b-11e9-ae24-2f6f7e5fbaa9.html [https://perma.cc/ 
XSF2-GGG6] (discussing a proposal to make Columbia, Missouri city council members 
full-time to make the council more diverse). 
 178 See Johnson, supra note 129, at 767–69 (outlining the statutory requirement of 
recusal when faced with conflicts of interest in outside employment). 
 179 See, e.g., Douglas E. Larson, A Model Ethical Code for Appointed Municipal 
Officials, 9 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 395, 395 (1989) (“[T]he very structure of some 
local government functions cause[s] ethical conflicts for elected and appointed officials 
which exacerbates the difficulty of conducting assigned responsibilities in an open and 
equitable fashion.”).  
 180 See SVARA, TWO DECADES, supra note 15 (discussing the increasing amount and 
complexity of problems that elected leaders in larger cities must respond to). 
1024 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 80:5 
by the part-time city council and no other institutional actor takes action, while 
in the latter situation, other institutions exercise power in ways that may diverge 
from how that power would have been exercised by city council. 
A. The Diminished Power of Part-Time Local Legislatures 
All things being equal,181 part-time and full-time city councils have 
equivalent legal powers, in terms of formal legal authority. In delegating legal 
authority to cities, state law typically does not make any distinction between 
whether that authority is exercised by a full-time city council or a part-time one. 
The designation of “city” under state law confers the same legal authority 
whether the city is a small town with a part-time city council or a major urban 
metropolis with a full-time city council: any incorporated municipality will 
typically have land use authority, authority to raise revenues through taxes and 
various fees, and general police power authority.182 Thus, from a formalistic 
perspective, if two cities are of the same legally designated class and home rule 
status under state law, a part-time city council in one city has the same formal 
legal authorities as a full-time city council in another city. However, as scholars 
have recognized in a range of contexts, formal legal authority is not the same as 
functional power,183 and there is a significant difference in how part-time and 
 
 181 I refer here to cities that have equal formal legal authority under state law. For 
example, charter (i.e., home rule) cities are vested with greater legal authority and powers 
under state law than non-charter cities. Similarly, some states categorize municipalities into 
different classes (usually by population bands) and grant different levels of authority to 
different classes. Within these categories, however, the legal authority granted under state 
law generally does not distinguish between full-time or part-time city councils: the city 
council, whatever its form, simply can exercise the legal powers granted to the local 
legislative body under state law. See generally SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 157, at 
62–64 (discussing home rule cities, the fight over relative formal power, and the effort to 
limit the lawmaking role of the city’s legislative delegation). 
 182 See Briffault, supra note 14, at 73 (“Municipal corporations—variously known as 
cities, boroughs, towns or villages—are general purpose goveruments [sic], providing a 
broad array of public services and authorized to exercise general police powers and impose 
general taxes on residents within the territorial limits.”). This general statement is subject to 
a few caveats. As noted above, state law distinguishes between charter and non-charter cities, 
with the former typically being granted broad home rule authority under state law, the latter 
only specific grants of authority in specific state laws, such as a state zoning enabling act. 
There may also be some state legal authority that is dependent on population size. See 
BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 41, at 330 (“[I]n many states, home rule extends only 
to some cities (usually the more populous ones) and counties (usually the most urbanized 
ones), not to all.”); Zale, supra note 5, at 865 (“Typically, home rule local governments are 
given authority to set their procedures for city council compensation while general law cities’ 
council compensation procedures are set by state law.”). 
 183 See SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 157, at 1 (examining the nature of city 
power and distinguishing between a city’s formal authority to engage in specific activities 
and its actual capacity to govern); see also Alan Rosenthal, The Good Legislature, NCSL 
ST. LEGISLATURES MAG. (July/Aug. 1999), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-
legislatures/the-good-legislature.aspx [https://perma.cc/5TYU-SHFQ] (“Although we 
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full-time city councils exercise their formal legal authority, due to differences 
in institutional resources, legislative capacity, and political capital. 
Institutional Resources. As noted above, part-time city councils by 
definition are characterized by less staff support and fewer administrative 
resources (such as office budgets—or even offices) than full-time councils.184 
Yet the substantive responsibilities that part-time city councils must respond to 
with their more limited resources can be substantial. For example, even in 
relatively small cities, city councils are responsible for making policy decisions 
about a wide range of service needs, determining when and how to exercise 
regulatory powers to advance the public health, safety, and welfare, and 
managing annual budgets in the millions.185 And as cities grow in population, 
there is a corresponding increase in the number and type of interest groups that 
compete for the attention and votes of council members.186 The increase in 
interest group activity and pressures makes the lack of institutional resources 
associated with a part-time council particularly acute in larger cities: one 
empirical survey indicated that eighty percent of council members in large cities 
(those with over 200,000 residents), without council staff, expressed a need for 
more staff support, and forty-three percent of council members in large cities, 
 
can measure the constitutional powers of governors and legislatures, their real power hinges 
as much on political factors and traditions as on constitutional and statutory ones.”). 
 184 See e.g., Nancy Hicks, City Council: Not the Perk-iest Job Around, LINCOLN J. STAR 
(Feb. 4, 2013), https://journalstar.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/city-council-not-the-
perk-iest-job-around/article_0e14c38d-2e30-50ed-b3d6-b98545ff3fa3.html [https://per 
ma.cc/RBZ5-JZLT] (“Every [part-time, Lincoln, Nebraska] council member has a tiny 
office in the City-County Building. But no phone. And they get no reimbursement for the 
cost of cellphones, which most use for city-related business. The council has one staff person 
who handles calls at the office and does general secretarial work. But council members have 
no staff to help with research.”). The same article also included the following editorial 
correction underscoring just how few institutional resources part-time city councils may 
have: “There is no money in the council budget for goodies. Every council member chips in 
$20 for cookies and candy. When the money is gone they take up another collection. An 
original version of this story was incorrect in suggesting the cookies were free.” Id. 
 185 See, e.g., Alvin D. Sokolov & Beth Walter Honadle, How Rural Local Governments 
Budget: The Alternatives to Executive Preparation, 44 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 373, 375 (1984) 
(presenting data on the expected expenditures of rural counties in Illinois and California); 
Tabori et al., supra note 158 (presenting a summary of the annual budget of University Park, 
Maryland and expenditures relating to general government, public works, and the police 
department); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2016 STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 
HISTORICAL DATASETS AND TABLES, https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/2016/econ/ 
local/public-use-datasets.html (click on US Summary & Alabama-Missippi) [on file with 
Ohio State Law Journal] (indicating that as of 2016, local governments as a whole in the 
United States were responsible for $1,805,682,720 in revenues and $1,838,514,959 in 
expenditures). 
 186 See SVARA, TWO DECADES, supra note 15, at 34 (noting that “council members in 
medium-sized cities are more like[ly] to complain about interest group pressure” and those 
“problems are worse as city size increases”).  
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where there was some existing staff support, expressed a need for more staff 
support.187  
The limited institutional resources of part-time city councils can also affect 
what council members utilize those resources to do. As noted above, in addition 
to their policymaking duties, city council members also spend a significant 
amount of time providing constituent services to residents.188 While the 
constituency services demanded of council members in a smaller city may be 
manageable on a part-time schedule,189 in mid-sized and larger cities where the 
part-time model is used, a single council member may have tens of thousands 
of constituents in their district.190 But because the institutional design of city 
councils often fails to adjust to changes in city population and demographics, 
part-time council members often still have only limited institutional resources 
to devote to increased constituency demands. As a result of reelection pressures, 
as well as obligational norms of representative office, part-time council 
members may be more likely to spend their limited institutional resources on 
constituency services rather than policymaking. For example, rather than having 
their single dedicated staffer gather research about a complicated budget 
proposal coming up for a vote, a council member may instead decide to have 
the staffer provide assistance to residents with various service requests.191 While 
 
 187 Id. at 1, 28, 39 (noting the “greater scale and complexity of problems as cities get 
larger make it harder in large cities to achieve the same level of effectiveness than is achieved 
in smaller cities”). 
 188 See Bone, supra note 76, at 1413 (noting that studies suggest that legislators receive 
many requests from constituents for assistance in dealing with the government); SVARA, TWO 
DECADES, supra note 15, at 11–13 (discussing how constituent services occupy a significant 
amount of time spent for city council members). 
 189 Even in smaller cities, the time commitments can be outsized. See, e.g., Chantal M. 
Lovell, City Council: Job Is Part-Time, But It’s a Full-Time Commitment, NAPA VALLEY 
REG. (Feb. 3, 2012), https://napavalleyregister.com/news/local/city-council-job-is-
part-time-but-it-s-a/article_8f9cdd8a-4e30-11e1-87c1-0019bb2963f4.html [https:// 
perma.cc/B6AJ-KUT3] (“Most part-time jobs end when employees make their final time-
card punch of the day. But if that part-time job is being a member of the Napa City Council, 
it follows the employee home, to the grocery store, to high school sporting events. City 
Council members said they spend in excess of 20 hours per week on city-related business, 
much of which happens after hours, on weekends and in the least-suspected places.”). 
 190 See SQUIRE & MONCRIEF, supra note 10, at 218 (“As populations grow, so, too, do 
the demands of the job.”); Zale, supra note 5, at 886 (“[I]t is not unusual for lawmakers of 
even midsize cities to be responsible for managing multimillion-dollar budgets, coordinating 
services for hundreds of thousands of residents, and overseeing thousands of public 
employees.”). 
 191 Empirical surveys of city council members indicate that council members in cities of 
all sizes spend a significant amount of their time—between one-third and one-half—on 
constituent services, but that council members in large cities (defined in the study as having 
a population greater than 200,000) who have full-time outside employment (i.e., who are 
serving in a part-time role in city council) spend over fifty percent of their time on constituent 
services, leading the study’s author to suggest that “[w]hereas constituent service is the 
option if you have more time in smaller cities, it appears to be the expected area of emphasis 
2019 PART-TIME GOVERNMENT 1027 
this may be a rational allocation of institutional resources from the individual 
council member’s perspective, it can have the effect of reducing the 
policymaking impact of the council.  
Legislative Capacity. Legislative capacity can be defined in a number of 
different ways, but at its core, it refers to the ability of a legislative institution to 
adequately respond to the needs and demands of constituents, to implement 
actions that yield their intended consequences, and to attract competent 
individuals to serve in office.192 While the capacity of every legislature is 
limited to a certain extent,193 the institutional design features of the part-time 
model impose particular constraints on the legislative capacity of city councils.  
In particular, because part-time city council positions provide relatively low 
pay, council members either must maintain outside employment or have an 
independent source of wealth to support themselves.194 For those part-time 
council members with outside employment, the result is that they are “serving 
 
to which more scarce hours will be devoted in large cities.” SVARA, TWO DECADES, supra 
note 15, at 1, 11–12. 
 192 See Wayne Parent & Michael B. Henderson, The Party’s Over: The Rise and Stall of 
Louisiana Legislative Independence, 48 LOY. L. REV. 527, 536, 539–43 (2002) (“Capability, 
therefore, involves both a negative dimension, insulation from exterior influence, and a 
positive dimension, the means to determine and achieve legislative goals.”). Political 
scientists often conceptualize legislative capacity in terms of professionalism. See, e.g., 
James D. King, Changes in Professionalism in U.S. State Legislatures, 25 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 
327, 329 (2000) (defining the concept of legislative professionalism as overlapping to some 
degree with the concept of legislative capacity and “involv[ing] the extent to which a 
legislature can command the full attention of its members, provide them with adequate 
resources to do their jobs in a manner comparable to that of other full-time political actors, 
and set up organizations and procedures that facilitate lawmaking”) (quoting Christopher Z. 
Mooney, Citizens, Structures, and Sister States: Influences on State Legislative 
Professionalism, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 47 (1995)); see also Karl Kurtz, Full- or Part-Time 
Legislature: Which Is Better?, THICKET ST. LEGIS. (Feb. 14, 2013), https://ncsl.type 
pad.com/the_thicket/2013/02/full-time-or-part-time-legislature-which-is-better.html 
[https://perma.cc/VT2V-4KDY] (“The concept of legislative professionalization is 
designed to measure the capacity of legislatures and legislators to make policy decisions. 
Capacity, though, does not necessarily mean performance. A legislature with high capacity 
can perform poorly (Congress being an example), while legislatures with low capacity can 
perform at high levels.”). 
 193 D. Roderick Kiewiet et al., The Implications of the Study of the U.S. Congress for 
Comparative Legislative Research, in LEGISLATURES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON 
REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES, supra note 122, at 7 (“Every legislature confronts an infinity 
of potential issues and policy choices but given the limits of time and labor, it can consider 
only a small number of proposals.”). 
 194 See, e.g., Turner, supra note 9 (“There are approximately 5,700 people employed by 
the city of Sacramento, but only nine are elected to make decisions about the future of our 
region. One is the mayor. The other eight are our City Council members. Fun fact: Because 
they are considered part-time city employees—and paid accordingly—each of them makes 
less than some city plumbers and parking lot supervisors. As a result, seven of the eight 
council members have second jobs.”). 
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two masters.”195 While conflict-of-interest rules can be adopted to address 
ethical concerns raised by this scenario, because council members’ time and 
attention are divided and they can only devote so many hours per week to 
government responsibilities, the council may be disadvantaged in terms of 
efficiency and effectiveness. For example, part-time councils may be hampered 
in their ability to effectively negotiate city contracts with private parties, which 
are typically represented by full-time lawyers, lobbyists, and other 
consultants.196 Even if there are full-time city staff that provide support to part-
time council members, council members must make the ultimate decision on 
issues. As a result, votes may be delayed, which not only slows the 
implementation of substantive policies that may be needed to regulate for public 
health, safety, and welfare,197 but also can potentially result in increased costs 
to taxpayers.198 
The low pay associated with the part-time model can also impact legislature 
capacity more subtly because of how it may impact the type of individuals most 
likely to serve and the activities those council members are likely to spend time 
and attention on. While the part-time model in theory allows anyone to serve, 
since it does not require giving up outside employment for a career position, in 
reality only a limited number of careers offer the flexibility needed to maintain 
outside employment while also serving in a part-time council position.199 As a 
 
 195 Id. 
 196 See, e.g., Ted S. McGregor, Jr., What You Pay For, INLANDER (Feb. 12, 2001), 
https://www.inlander.com/spokane/what-you-pay-for/Content?oid=2173372 [https:// 
perma.cc/GY48-W8VX] (“[T]he shortcomings of a part-time council have become most 
clear in issues like the Lincoln Street Bridge, which no single part-time council member 
could ever defuse, and the River Park Square parking garage, where, it appears, a part-time 
council was ground into submission by its partner (made up of full-time consultants, lawyers, 
etc.). This is not to say that a full-time council would have averted these and other disasters, 
but at least the citizenry would know that their elected officials were expected to devote their 
full attention to the city’s business.”). 
 197 Particularly in growing mid-sized and larger cities, where there is more likely to be 
a misalignment between the numerous and complex policy issues the city council is 
responsible for and the constraints imposed by the part-time model on the ability of the 
council to effectively respond, the part-time model may result in a kind of catch-22: “It’s 
really irrational . . . . We don’t want to equip politicians with the resources to do their jobs, 
and then we blame them when things don’t work the way we want.” Thomson-DeVeaux, 
supra note 132. 
 198 See McGregor, supra note 196 (discussing the shortcomings of part-time councils in 
regard to negotiating contracts with private parties). 
 199 See, e.g., Marti Mikkelson, Milwaukee County Board Goes Part-Time, WUWM 
(Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.wuwm.com/post/milwaukee-county-board-goes-part-
time#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/P9S7-84VT] (“[Part-time member] Taylor still has 
another job and intends to keep it . . . . Taylor says she hopes the newly-reconfigured county 
board holds its meetings at night, so it’s easier to handle two jobs.”); see also SVARA, TWO 
DECADES, supra note 15, at 57 (“[A]n increasingly important question in progressively 
smaller cities is whether the ‘citizen-council member’ who combines regular employment 
with council service is being driven away from the council because of the demands of the 
position.”); Zale, supra note 5, at 885 (“Small business owners or independent contractors 
2019 PART-TIME GOVERNMENT 1029 
result, rather than being filled with a wide swath of individuals from different 
careers and backgrounds, as the citizen legislature model aspires for, members 
of part-time councils are often heavily drawn from the business community.200 
While such individuals may be just as civically minded as other residents, the 
legislative capacity of city councils composed of such individuals may be 
reduced, since evidence suggests that part-time councils comprised primarily of 
members from the business sector tend to focus on “running government like a 
business,” rather than engaging in long-term planning goals and innovative 
policymaking.201  
Political Capital. Finally, city councils utilizing the part-time model 
typically have less political capital to work with than full-time councils do. 
Political capital as used here refers to the extent to which lawmakers are 
entrusted by voters to engage in policymaking. While voters may trust 
individual part-time council members just as much—or just as little—as full-
time ones, the part-time model shapes voters’ expectations of those who serve 
in the position.202 For example, part-time council members who suggest that 
their responsibilities are closer to full-time may face political pushback to 
“perform the job as designed”203 and be criticized for “getting up to all sorts of 
legislative and administrative mischief.”204 
Furthermore, the diminished political capital of the part-time model can 
create a feedback loop that may make it more challenging to attract individuals 
to serve in city council. As one scholar has noted: “[A]s the real policymaking 
discretion of nonfederal office decreases, ambitious and civic-minded citizens 
 
may be able to do so, but hourly and salaried employees are less likely to have the flexibility 
to devote the additional hours needed for a part-time council position, which may entail 
attending weekly midday council meetings and responding to time-sensitive constituent 
requests. Furthermore . . . many officially part-time city councils actually impose nearly full-
time responsibilities, further limiting the pool of candidates who have outside careers that 
can accommodate such a schedule.” (citations omitted)). 
 200 See Zale, supra note 5, at 885 (discussing how small business owners and 
independent contractors are more likely than hourly or salaried employees to have the 
necessary flexibility to serve on a part-time council). 
 201 See Larry Terry, El Paso: Professionalism over Politics in the Shift to Council-
Manager Government, in MORE THAN MAYOR OR MANAGER: CAMPAIGNS TO CHANGE FORM 
OF GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA’S LARGEST CITIES, supra note 15, at 230 (“The elected [part-
time council] positions did not pay much. Most politicians had their own wealth, and were 
only interested in keeping things status quo. They ran government like a business from the 
basic standpoint of trying to balance the budget. There was no long-term planning 
approach.”).  
 202 See Sharon Moloney, City Council Is Blaming Shirey for Problems That It Has 
Caused, CIN. POST, June 30, 1999, at 14A (describing dissatisfaction with the part-time 
Cincinnati city council, “which once met for a couple of hours a week, now drags meeting 
on for hours almost every day”). 
 203 Joe Kirby, Letter: City Council: ‘Perform the Job as Designed’, ARGUS LEADER 
(Dec. 16, 2017), https://www.argusleader.com/story/opinion/readers/2017/12/16/letter-
city-council-perform-job-designed/108661708/ [https://perma.cc/E9FL-X7GL]. 
 204 See Moloney, supra note 202. 
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would abandon nonfederal politics and instead substitute other activities where 
their public spirit and ambition can be satisfied more fully . . . . The loss of 
discretion might be an especially great deterrent to local officeholding.”205 
While we may not want every city council member in every city to be a “public 
entrepreneur” engaging in innovative policymaking,206 the diminished political 
capital associated with the part-time model means that in cases where we do 
want such individuals to serve, it may be more challenging to attract them.207 
That part-time city councils have diminished institutional resources, 
legislative capacity, and political capital is in a sense baked into the institutional 
design of the part-time structure: these limitations are the intentional 
consequences of an institutional design that is often chosen precisely because of 
resident preferences for limited government, citizen legislators, and fiscal 
savings. But the impact of this institutional design choice on power dynamics in 
local governance has largely gone unrecognized. The next Part turns to 
unpacking these power dynamics. 
B. Where Does Power Go? 
As discussed above, a part-time city council has less power—in terms of 
capacity, resources, and political capital—than a full-time city council.208 
Where does this power go? On one hand, the diminished power of part-time city 
councils may mean that power goes unexercised: ordinances that are never 
passed, city services that are never funded, intergovernmental agreements that 
are never entered into. On the other hand, the diminished power of part-time city 
councils may mean that power gets redistributed to other institutions—states, 
other city officials, other units of local government, and private actors—which 
exercise power in ways that may diverge from how that power would have been 
exercised by city council. To better understand the connections between this 
institutional design choice and city power, Part III.B develops a taxonomy of 
 
 205 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State 
Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 894–96, 
895 n.272 (1998). 
 206 See generally MARK SCHNEIDER ET AL., PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURS: AGENTS FOR 
CHANGE IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS (1995) (discussing how and why certain actors in 
local government—particularly, mayors, city managers, and individual citizens—emerge as 
forces of policy innovation). 
 207 See Rob Gurwitt, Are City Councils a Relic of the Past?, GOVERNING STATES & 
LOCALITIES (Apr. 2003), http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/Are-City-Councils-
Relic-Past.html [https://perma.cc/2LRY-WVE6] (“[W]hen little is expected of [city 
councils], because a city’s most important decisions are made elsewhere, it’s no surprise that 
over time the ambitions of their members shrink to take in smaller and smaller patches of 
turf.”). The limited discretion of city council is shaped by factors in addition to the design 
choice of the part-time model, such as state law limitations and the structural design of the 
office of mayor as a strong or weak model, which may on their own deter some civically 
engaged and ambitious individuals from serving. See id. 
 208 See supra Part III.A. 
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how the part-time model can produce power vacuums and redistribute power to 
other institutional actors. It is important to note that the discussion herein is a 
descriptive one; the normative implications of the power vacuums and 
redistributions of power catalogued below will be analyzed further in Part IV. 
1. Power Unexercised 
As noted above, a part-time city council has fewer institutional resources 
and less legislative capacity and political capital than a full-time body.209 It is 
therefore logical to expect that a part-time council will do less with its formal 
legal authority, even if it is equivalent to that of a full-time body. A lack of 
empirical data makes it challenging to come to definitive conclusions about the 
absence of action—for example, the fact that an ordinance is not enacted or an 
intergovernmental agreement is not entered into by a part-time council does not 
necessarily mean that it would be by a full-time one. However, a theoretical 
account of the circumstances, in which we might expect to see power vacuums 
associated with the part-time model, can be built by drawing on legal theory 
about the various powers and duties of city council set out in Table 1,210 as well 
as anecdotal accounts from council members and residents reported in the 
media. This Part catalogues the types of circumstances in which formal power, 
if unexercised by city council, is unlikely to be exercised by any other actor.  
Powers Exclusively Vested in City Council. As indicated in Table 1, many 
powers held by city council are powers shared to varying extents with other 
institutional actors.211 For example, the council and the mayor are often jointly 
responsible for drafting a legislative agenda for the city, a policy document that 
lays out the city’s policy goals to be advocated and lobbied for in the state 
legislature.212 If a city council fails to exercise its power to assist in the 
preparation of the agenda, there is another institutional actor—the mayor’s 
office—legally authorized to engage in this action.213 Similarly, while city 
councils have the power to enact ordinances pursuant to their police power, state 
legislatures also have the power to enact state law pursuant to their police 
power.214 While specific types of home rule and other limitations of state law—
such as bans on special commissions or bans on special legislation—may limit 
the state legislature’s ability to displace local law,215 for the most part, the broad 
scope of state police powers and state preemptive authority means that, if it 
chooses to, a state legislature can both displace police powers exercised by a 
 
 209 See supra Part III.A. 
 210 See supra Table 1. 
 211 See id. 
 212 See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) About City Government, supra note 
102. 
 213 See id. 
 214 See supra Table 1; BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 41, at 327. 
 215 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 41, at 293–302 (describing state constitutional 
provisions banning special commissions and special legislation). 
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city council (through preemption) as well as exercise police powers left 
unexercised by a city council. 
However, there are some powers that, if they are to be exercised at all, must 
be exercised by the city council itself. For example, if two or more local 
governments wish to enter into an intergovernmental agreement, state law 
typically requires an affirmative vote of the governing body of each.216 Thus, if 
City A and County B wish to enter into an agreement for joint services (to more 
efficiently provide recycling or public transportation services, for example), the 
agreement must be approved by both the city council and the county’s governing 
body.217 If a city council does not exercise its power to enter into 
intergovernmental agreements, no other institutional actor is legally authorized 
to perform this particular function.218 Similarly, if a city council is vested 
exclusively with the authority to create administrative commissions to advise on 
select policy issues and appoint members to those commissions,219 then if the 
city council does not exercise its power to establish and appoint members to 
such commissions, no other institutional actor is legally authorized to do so. 
While the author is not aware of any comparative studies on how frequently 
cities with part-time councils enter into intergovernmental agreements or 
authorize the creation of administrative compared to full-time councils,220 if a 
part-time council fails to act with regard to these or other types of powers which 
it has exclusive authority over, there will not be any other actor who can step in 
to take action. 
 
 216 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-952(f) (2015) (requiring “[a]ppropriate action 
by ordinance or resolution or otherwise pursuant to the laws applicable to the governing 
bodies of the participating agencies”).  
 217 See id. 
 218 See id. 
 219 Whether council or the mayor or both are authorized to establish administrative 
commissions, and the type of commissions they are authorized to establish, varies by 
jurisdiction. The subject matters that local administrative commissions and boards may 
advise on is quite diverse. See, e.g., TUCSON, ARIZ. CHARTER & GEN. ORDINANCES, ch. 10A 
(1987), http://library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Arizona/tucson_az/tucsonarizona  
charterandgeneralordinances?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:tucson_
az [on file with Ohio State Law Journal] (describing various community affairs commissions 
that have been established in Tucson, Arizona, including a “Youth and Delinquency 
Prevention Council,” a “Commission on Disability Issues,” a “Commission on Food 
Security, Heritage, and Economy,” and several others); Boards and Commissions, CITY OF 
HOUSTON, TEX., https://www.houstontx.gov/boards/ [https://perma.cc/6UT6-C45E] 
(describing various boards and commissions established in Houston, Texas, including a 
“Bicycle Advisory Committee,” a “Health Benefits Advisory Committee,” a “LGBTQ 
Advisory Board,” and dozens of others). 
 220 It should be recognized that the part-time model could actually result in greater 
exercise of these powers, since a particular intergovernmental agreement might reduce the 
responsibilities of city council, and an administrative commission may help reduce the 
workload of council by shifting some responsibilities to commission members. Additional 
empirical research on this question could thus offer interesting insights. 
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Political Power Versus Legislative Power. Although not mandated by law, 
constituent services are an integral part of any legislator’s role, whether 
Congressperson, state senator, or city council member.221 While members of 
Congress typically have staff who handle most constituent service needs, for 
many city council members—who often have no personal staff or only a single 
shared staff member—providing constituent services requires a significant 
amount of their time.222 Furthermore, data indicate council members in part-
time bodies spend proportionately more of their time on constituent services 
than members of full-time bodies.223 It impossible to quantify precisely which 
legislative powers may go unexercised by a council because members are 
engaged in providing constituent services. However, a logical conclusion to 
draw from this data is that some exercises of legislative power that would 
otherwise occur in part-time councils do not occur because part-time council 
members make the rational decision to utilize their limited time, capacity, and 
resources to exercise more political power in the form of constituent services. 
“Small” Powers. As noted in Part I.A, while high-profile city council 
policies get headlines—whether progressive ordinances like sanctuary city 
laws,224 or conservative ones like gun ownership mandates225—many laws 
enacted by a typical city council are “nuts and bolts” ordinances involving 
seemingly mundane, but necessary, logistical and bureaucratic actions, which if 
left undone would risk the effective functioning of city departments and public 
services (and the associated voter discontent and bad press).226 Other council 
actions that may occupy a significant amount of time and attention, but which 
fail to make headlines, are those required to comply with state or federal law, 
which the city must satisfy to avoid possible lawsuits or loss of 
intergovernmental funding.227  
 
 221 See SVARA, TWO DECADES, supra note 15, at 11–12. 
 222 See id. 
 223 See id. (showing survey data indicating that in medium cities with part-time councils, 
members spend forty-three percent of their time on constituent services, compared to 
medium cities with full-time councils, in which members spend thirty-three percent of their 
time on constituent services). 
 224 See, e.g., Martin Macias, Jr., Los Angeles City Council Declares LA a Sanctuary City, 
COURTHOUSE NEWS (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/los-angeles-city-
council-declares-la-a-sanctuary-city/ [https://perma.cc/U2JE-YQYH]. 
 225 See, e.g., Nancy Lofholm, Nucla Becomes Colorado’s First and Only Town 
Mandating Gun Ownership, DENV. POST (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.denver 
post.com/2013/05/24/nucla-becomes-colorados-first-and-only-town-mandating-gun-
ownership/ [https://perma.cc/36H4-6XDM]. 
 226 See City Councils, supra note 86 (listing a number of typical city council functions). 
 227 See, e.g., US Sues Mount Vernon, Alleging Clean Water Act Violations, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (June 28, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/cef619a2b3114046a785f27a358db  
734 [https://perma.cc/M5RE-ESC4]. A federal lawsuit was filed against the city of Mount 
Vernon for violating the Clean Water Act by failing to comply with rules meant to stop raw 
sewage from polluting waterways. Id. The city’s mayor “blamed inaction by the city council 
on the crisis: ‘I need the public’s help. Tell the council: “Do your job.”‘ he said.” Id. 
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Because part-time councils have limited resources and capacity, it is rational 
for them to focus their attention on the most essential of these nuts and bolts 
responsibilities, and on federally or state-mandated actions. This is not to say 
that cities with part-time city councils fail to regulate on “small” issues: as a 
quick online search of local codes of ordinances will reveal, there are any 
number of idiosyncratic, seemingly minor aspects of local life that city councils 
have enacted regulations on, from requiring a permit for wearing high heels and 
banning hats on public property,228 to highly detailed design standards found in 
many local land use regulations.229 But with regard to these “small” exercises 
of power, if a city council does not act, it is unlikely that any other institutional 
actors will step in. While the absence of local regulation on high heels or hats is 
unlikely to be a cause for alarm (and in fact may be welcomed), the absence of 
regulation on other “small” issues, such as detail-oriented revisions to floodplain 
building standards or parking requirements for changing development patterns, 
may prove to be a regulatory vacuum that poses more serious public policy 
concerns. 
2. Power Redistributed 
While the diminished power of part-time city councils is likely to result in 
a power vacuum with respect to the types of actions discussed in Part III.B.1, 
for other issues—and particularly for those that are contested—the diminished 
power of a part-time city council may result in a redistribution of power to 
another institutional actor.230 Part III.B.2 maps out other institutional actors to 
 
 228 See CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 8.44 (2019), https://www.code 
publishing.com/CA/CarmelbytheSea/html/Carmel08/Carmel0844.html  [https://perma 
.cc/VA4H-X96V] (requiring a permit for heels over two inches tall); Alina Hunter-Grah, 
City Council Removes Outdated Laws from City Code, NOOGA TODAY (Oct. 31, 2018), 
https://noogatoday.6amcity.com/city-council-chattanooga-old-laws/ [https://perma.cc/ 
TY3V-7QUD] (describing a recently repealed ban on wearing hats in theatres or public 
places in the city of Chattanooga, Tennessee). 
 229 See, e.g., CITY OF PORTLAND, OR., TREE & LANDSCAPING MANUAL (2017), 
https://www.portlandoregon.gov/bds/article/104895 [https://perma.cc/K8FG-N4M5]; 
CITY OF ENCINITAS, CAL., DESIGN GUIDELINES (Apr. 2005), http://ci.encinitas.ca.us/ 
Portals/0/City%20Documents/Documents/Development%20Services/Planning/Land
%20Development/Design%20Review%20Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4VV-
FLUD]. 
 230 See, e.g., Nathaniel Herz, Alaska’s Citizen Legislature Is Now Pretty Much Full-
Time, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (July 9, 2016), https://www.adn.com/politics/2016/07/ 
09/alaskas-citizen-legislature-is-now-pretty-much-full-time/ [https://perma.cc/YK6G 
-SQVM]: 
Part-time lawmakers with less time and fewer staffers end up ceding some of their 
power. And “power doesn’t go away,” he said. “If you take power away from 
legislators, it goes to lobbyists or the administration,” said Thomas. A strong legislative 
branch, he added, “puts a check on a strong executive, and it enables people to look at 
things in depth that they wouldn’t be able to if they were making $200 a month.”  
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whom power is likely to be redistributed to as a result of a part-time city council. 
These redistributions of power can be conceptualized along four axes: (1) 
vertically to the state;231 (2) horizontally to other units of local government; (3) 
internally to other branches of city government; and (4) orthogonally to private 
actors.  
Vertical Redistribution of Power. The balance of power between states and 
local governments, particularly cities, is one of the central concerns of local 
government law.232 While black letter law suggests that states have the upper 
hand,233 scholars have recognized that the actual power dynamics between 
states and cities are more nuanced, and that a range of background principles of 
state law as well as political considerations affect the power dynamics between 
states and cities.234  
The impact of internal structures of local governments on state-local 
relations has received less attention, but internal institutional design decisions 
in cities can also affect the power relationship between cities and states.235 With 
respect to the specific institutional design choice of a part-time city council, 
because such bodies have reduced capacity, resources, and political capital as 
discussed above, cities with part-time councils may be less likely to act in ways 
 
Id. (quoting Clive Thomas, former political science professor at University of Alaska 
Southeast); Laura Tomaka, In Midwest, States Split on Whether Legislating Should Be Part-
Time or Full-Time, COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS MIDWEST (July/Aug. 2014), 
https://www.csgmidwest.org/policyresearch/0814-legislatures-Midwest.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/X89A-6V4D] Political scientist Gary Moncrief stated that he has “never 
understood why some legislators want to weaken the legislative institution—which is 
certainly closer to ‘the people’ than the executive or the judicial institutions. Weakening the 
legislature simply makes the executive branch relatively stronger, and [] it makes interest 
groups relatively stronger as well.” (citation omitted). Id. 
 231 The part-time model may also redistribute power vertically to the federal 
government, but given that the state is the intermediary in most federal-local interactions, 
the discussion herein focuses on vertical redistributions of power to the state.  
 232 See supra Part II.A (citing some of the vast literature on the topic). 
 233 See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.  
 234 As noted in Part II.A, there is an inherent tension between the top-down view of state 
control over local governments—as represented by Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 
(1907) and its progeny cases, Dillon’s Rule, and state preemption—and the view of local 
autonomy that legal doctrines and principles, such as home rule and bans on special 
legislation, support. See Richard Schragger, Decentralization and Development, 96 VA. L. 
REV. 1837, 1865 (2010) (“[Local government law is] an oft-changing, arguably cyclical 
battle between political interests (often ‘reformers’ and ‘machines’) that results in a grab bag 
of institutional constraints, some favoring the centralization of power and some favoring the 
decentralization of power. Localism is forever contested.”). 
 235 In states where the state legislature is also considered part-time, the extent of the 
vertical redistribution of power from the systematic prevalence of part-time local 
government may be diminished: while the part-time model may diminish the power of city 
councils, if the state legislature is also part-time, it is not as likely to be a significant recipient 
of that redistributed power. However, power may flow to other state actors, such as the 
executive branch and state administrative agencies. 
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that challenge—or serve as a counterweight to—state authority.236 This is not 
to say that cities with part-time councils cannot engage in innovative 
policymaking or act in ways that serve as a check against the state: they can and 
they do.237 But for the reasons discussed in Part II, a part-time city council is 
more likely to spend its limited resources and capacity on running the business 
of local government in ways that address the immediate service needs of 
residents.  
Horizontal Redistribution of Power. The part-time model of city councils 
also may affect the horizontal distribution of power between different units of 
local government. In particular, cities with part-time city councils may rely more 
extensively on special purpose districts to provide core governmental services 
that would otherwise be within the city’s purview.238 Special purpose districts 
are a specialized form of local government authorized under state law to engage 
in discrete functions that would otherwise be the responsibility of the general 
purpose local government, such as a sanitation district, a flood control authority, 
or a hospital management district.239 Special districts offer fiscal and legal 
advantages that may make them an appealing option regardless of the part-time 
or full-time status of a city council,240 but it is reasonable to think that for cities 
with part-time councils, the transfer of authority over governmental functions to 
another unit of government may be particularly appealing. While this may allow 
the part-time council to focus its limited capacity on its remaining duties, 
 
 236 While states typically can rely on their power of preemption, as well as their 
significant control over local fiscal capacity to rein in local governments whose policies they 
disagree with, states may also on occasion force changes to the internal structures of city 
councils with the express goal of disempowering them. See Mikkelson, supra note 199. For 
example, in 2016 the Wisconsin state legislature initiated a referendum process to make the 
formerly full-time Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors part-time. See id. 
 237 See, e.g., Marc Nathanson, Armed with a New Ordinance, a Small Town in Florida 
Fights Back Against Hate, ABC NEWS (May 31, 2019), https://abcnews.go.com/US/ 
armed-ordinance-small-town-florida-fights-back-hate/story?id=63079013 [https:// 
perma.cc/YA4F-XQNF] (describing efforts by a small town in Florida, which passed a 
“local hate-crime ordinance in 2017 [by taking] the U.S. State Department’s 2010 guidelines 
on anti-Semitism and [codifying] them into a section of the village code entitled 
‘Consideration of Anti-Semitism in Enforcing Laws’”). 
 238 Power may also be redistributed horizontally to counties, which may or may not also 
have part-time, elected governing boards. See Note, Impairment of Contracts by 
Municipalities, 31 HARV. L. REV. 875, 880 (1918) (noting that “both legislative and 
administrative powers are vested in city councils and county commissioners”). 
 239 What Is a Special District?, MUN. RES. & SERVS. CTR., http://mrsc.org/ 
Home/Explore-Topics/Governance/Forms-of-Government-and-Organization/Special-
Purpose-Districts-in-Washington/What-is-a-Special-District.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
XW69-ZWNP]. 
 240 KIMIA MAZANY & APRIL MANATT, WHAT’S SO SPECIAL ABOUT SPECIAL DISTRICTS? 
10 (3rd ed. 2002), https://www.cameronpark.org/misc_pdfs/Whats_So_Special.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/C6E5-3HFQ] (describing various advantages of special purpose 
districts). 
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because the extent of policy issues that it controls has shrunk, the city council is 
also less powerful.241 
Internal Redistributions of Power. Public administration scholars have 
devoted significant attention to internal power dynamics within city 
governments.242 For example, public administration scholarship has examined 
how changes in the form of government (mayor-council or council-manager), 
type of council elections (district, at-large, or hybrid), and use of term limits 
affect the balance of power between different local elected officials.243 
However, the internal redistribution of power associated with part-time city 
councils has been less well-explored.  
Because the internal structures of city governments vary, where power goes 
internally as a result of the part-time model of city councils will also vary, 
depending on the particular institutional design of a city government. In council-
manager cities, the council holds legislative, executive, and quasi-judicial 
powers, and the manager is a city employee hired by the council and delegated 
administrative and executive authority.244 While formally, the manager is 
ultimately responsible to the city council as an appointed employee, when the 
city council is part-time, the result may be that the council defers to, and is more 
reliant on, the city manager and the administrative staff than a full-time body 
would be.  
In a mayor-council form of government, executive powers are held by the 
independently elected mayor.245 The potential for power struggles between the 
mayor and council is built into this form of government, and the local legislature 
and the local executive each act as a check on the other’s power.246 The part-
time status of a city council is thus likely to tip the balance of power in favor of 
the mayor, particularly if the mayor is of the strong mayor variety. In cities with 
both a part-time city council and a part-time mayor, the mayor is unlikely to 
receive a significant boost in power as a result of the part-time city council 
model, since as a part-time figure herself, her powers are already likely 
significantly constrained by the city charter or state law. Instead, power is likely 
to flow internally to the appointed city manager, as well as to the administrative 
bureaucracy of the city.  
 
 241 See id. at 11. 
 242 See supra Part II.B. 
 243 See id. 
 244 See MORE THAN MAYOR OR MANAGER, supra note 15, at 4, 7. 
 245 See id. at 8. 
 246 See SVARA, TWO DECADES, supra note 15, at 52. In mayor-council cities, there is 
more competition between mayors and councils with regard to “policy initiation”:  
[T]here may be tension with the mayor even if they [council] are largely in agreement 
about policy objectives . . . . [S]ince the council in the mayor-council city has a 
potentially adversarial relationship with the mayor whom it cannot control, it may be 
inclined to seek ways to expand its capacity to compete with the mayor or secure greater 
independence from the mayor. 
Id. 
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In addition to affecting the distribution of power between the local executive 
(whether mayor or manager) and local legislature, the part-time model also can 
have implications for the power held by local boards and agencies, such as 
planning boards, ethics commissions, and myriad other administrative decision-
making bodies. Due to its own limited resources, a part-time city council may 
need to rely more on such agencies, but at the same time have less capacity to 
oversee them.247 
Public-Private Redistributions of Power. In addition to redistributing power 
to the various government actors described above, part-time city councils also 
can reshape the power dynamics between public and private actors. While every 
democratic polity is to some extent an aggregation of collective private interests, 
it is in cities where this intermingling of the private and public is arguably at its 
most potent. As Professor Richard Schragger has observed, “the city is an 
economic phenomenon and a legal one; an agglomeration of person, goods, and 
capital, as well as a political jurisdiction; a marketplace and constitutional 
entity.”248 The very term “municipal corporation” reflects the historical origins 
of the city as a corporate body, which was initially treated no differently under 
the law than were private corporations,249 and which still today often reflects 
private, associational values to a greater degree than other types of 
government.250 
Part-time city councils can shift power to private interests in a number of 
ways. First, part-time councils may result in a shift in power to outside interests 
with respect to drafting local legislation because a part-time city council simply 
has fewer resources and less capacity to devote to the task itself.251 Although 
 
 247 See Tomaka, supra note 230 (“Michigan Rep. Amanda Price adds that the effort in 
her state has been fueled by groups of people ‘who believe that a full-time legislature has led 
to over-regulation and over-taxation of citizens in Michigan. The thought of a part-time 
legislature may be attractive to some in that it could save tax dollars or reduce the size of 
government,’ Price says. ‘However, it is important to point out that the bureaucracy would 
remain in place without as much oversight from elected representatives who can voice 
people’s concerns.’”). 
 248 See SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 157, at 6–7 (discussing the dual identity 
of cities: “[T]he city resists our usual distinctions between market and state, private and 
public, business and government . . . . It is also why we struggle with the city’s legal and 
political authority, for much of what a city does as a policy or legal matter enhances private 
wealth or detracts from it.”). 
 249 See Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the Municipal Corporation: A Case Study in 
Legal Change, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 429 (1985). 
 250 See NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 116–17 
(1995) (“[W]hen entrepreneurs solve the collective action problem (as in the creation of 
many cities), the result is a government that embodies two sets of values—those of the 
entrepreneur and those of the citizens necessary to the formation effort.”). 
 251 See Michael B. Berkman, Legislative Professionalism and the Demand for Groups: 
The Institutional Context of Interest Population Density, 26 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 661, 665, 673 
(2001) (noting that less professional state legislatures will likely be less capable of 
independently evaluating policy and proposing legislation, and therefore will likely rely 
more heavily on information provided by outside groups). 
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lobbyists for private industry have not traditionally been a major factor in local 
politics,252 they have increasingly turned their attention to local governments.253 
For example, national anti-poverty and labor groups have engaged in a 
concerted nationwide effort to promote minimum living wage ordinances.254 On 
the other end of the political spectrum, the conservative American Legislative 
Exchange Council (ALEC) has brought its considerable forces to bear on cities 
in the form of ACCE, the American City County Exchange, which connects 
local lawmakers with industry groups that can offer model legislation.255 While 
one may agree or disagree with the substantive agendas of various outside 
lobbying groups, part-time local legislators may understandably welcome the 
outside lawmaking support, as it were. As one part-time city council member 
noted of ACCE: “[They] can act like ‘an ideal lobbyist,’ filling the void left by 
the lack of staff—and the ideas they might generate—at the local level.”256  
The part-time model also shifts power to private actors because the very 
design of part-time city councils—with its low pay and permissibility of outside 
employment—evidences a tolerance for, and even expectation of, a certain 
degree of intermingling of the private and public in elected officials 
themselves.257 For example, conflict-of-interest rules for part-time city councils 
regarding outside employment and interests retain a certain degree of 
“looseness” that might not be tolerated for full-time bodies, simply because of 
the need to allow for part-time legislators’ continued outside employment in 
light of the low salary provided for the position.258  
 
 252 A notable exception is the so-called “growth machine” in urban land use and 
development politics. But outside of the land use context, lobbying for private industry at 
the local level has typically been limited: the sheer number of municipalities and the limited 
reach of each municipality’s jurisdiction have meant that, except in the case of major urban 
cities or with respect to particularly sensitive issues, it has been generally more logical for 
lobbyists to focus their efforts on state lawmakers. 
 253 See, e.g., Schragger, American Cities, supra note 73, at 1227. 
 254 See id. (noting such “efforts have generally been spearheaded by national labor and 
anti-poverty groups working as part of a larger cross-city effort to regulate using the tools of 
municipal government”). 
 255 Alan Greenblatt, ALEC Goes Local, GOVERNING STATES & LOCALITIES (June 2014), 
http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-alec-goes-local.html [https://perma.cc 
/PF9P-VC4Z]. 
 256 Id. (quoting Todd Grayson, a member of the Perrysburg, Ohio City Council). 
 257 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Corruption and Federalism: (When) Do Federal Criminal 
Prosecution Improve Non-Federal Democracy?, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 113, 121–
22 (2005) The nature of local elected office “precludes the sorts of conflict of interest rules 
used by the federal government. One cannot insist on the prophylactic separation of public 
and private motives where most decision-makers are part-time officials with extensive 
private interests . . . . Divestiture, or even disclosure, of private interests is rarely required by 
state law of lay decision-makers, perhaps because the cost of these remedies would deter 
what is, after all, unpaid and unglamorous service.” Id. 
 258 See CTR. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PUB. INTEGRITY, AN HONEST DAY’S WORK: 
REGULATING STATE LAWMAKERS’ OUTSIDE INCOME 1 (Sept. 2016), https://www.law 
.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/public-integrity/images/regulating_out 
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Finally, the part-time model may shift the balance of power to the private 
end of the spectrum because cities with part-time councils may rely more 
heavily on privatization of government services. While the potential cost 
savings of privatization may appeal to cities of all sizes, regardless of whether 
city council is full-time or part-time,259 there is likely to be an even stronger 
appeal for cities that have part-time city councils.260 By contracting out for 
private provision of services—whether information technology or towing 
services or water utilities—part-time city councils can focus their limited time 
and resources on other governmental matters. While they may still have to 
approve annual contracts for privatized services and set up a monitoring 
mechanism to oversee the outsourced services, there is no longer a city 
department with public employees and the myriad legal concerns associated 
with it demanding the council’s attention. 
The framework developed in this Part offers a taxonomy of how the part-
time model produces power vacuums and redistributes power. This framework 
is not meant to provide a mathematically precise measurement of how much 
 
side_income_of_legislative_officers_-_capi_issue_brief_-_september_2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/385H-4URQ] (discussing the challenge of developing conflict of interest 
rules for state legislators in light of the fact that state legislative positions “are generally low-
paid and part-time” and legislators “have the right—perhaps even the need—to supplement 
their salaries”); Nicholas Kusnetz, Conflicts of Interest Run Rampant in State Legislatures, 
CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/03/ 
18/12313/conflicts-interest-run-rampant-state-legislatures  [https://perma.cc/QDS7-
5PWW] (discussing the widespread prevalence of conflicts of interests in part-time state 
legislatures, where “unless [members] are retired or wealthy, they must find another way to 
earn a living”). 
 259 See, e.g., Russell Nichols, The Pros and Cons of Privatizing Government Functions, 
GOVERNING STATES & LOCALITIES (Dec. 2010), https://www.governing.com/topics/ 
mgmt/pros-cons-privatizing-government-functions.html  [https://perma.cc/YMV3-
LZ7G] (“As former mayor of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Gov. Ed Rendell saved $275 
million by privatizing 49 city services. Chicago has privatized more than 40 city services. 
Since 2005, it has generated more than $3 billion in upfront payments from private-sector 
leases of city assets.”). However, it is worth emphasizing the “potential” cost savings from 
privatization: “For governments that forgo due diligence, choose ill-equipped contractors 
and fail to monitor progress, however, outsourcing deals can turn into costly disasters.” Id. 
Chicago’s privatization of parking meters, for example, has become a notorious example of 
privatization gone wrong. See Chicago’s Parking Meter Deal a Lesson in ‘Worst Practices’, 
BETTER GOV’T ASS’N, https://www.bettergov.org/news/chicagos-parking-meter-deal-
a-lesson-in-worst-practices/ [https://perma.cc/NT4F-R58T] (describing various problems 
created by Chicago’s privatization of parking meters). 
 260 While the author is not aware of any empirical studies on the correlation of 
privatization with part-time city councils, empirical data on privatization and small 
municipalities provide indirect support for this claim. Empirical data on privatization 
indicate the municipalities most likely to privatize services are smaller municipalities. See, 
e.g., Yolanda K. Kodrzycki, Privatization of Local Public Services: Lessons for New 
England, NEW ENG. ECON. REV. 31, 35 (May/June 1994). Further, as noted above, the part-
time model, while prevalent across cities of all sizes, is particularly likely to be utilized in 
smaller cities. See supra Part I. 
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power is unexercised versus redistributed as a result of the part-time model, nor 
does it capture the full extent of real-world variables that might affect when 
power is more likely to shift from a city council to the state versus another unit 
of local government or private actors. But it does offer an analytical tool to 
clarify and refine our intuitions about the connections between local government 
structures and the power of government institutions. The next Part further 
develops this framework by analyzing the normative implications of these 
power dynamics. 
IV. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND CITY POWER 
The framework developed in the previous Part mapped out how the part-
time model reduces the effective power of city councils, and how it can both 
produce power vacuums and redistribute power to other institutions. Once these 
power dynamics are recognized, a further normative question presents itself: Is 
the part-time model a problem? On one hand, power unexercised by a part-time 
city council may be desirable if there is a lack of institutional competence or a 
risk of city council actions that impose externalities. On the other hand, a power 
vacuum may be more problematic if welfare-enhancing opportunities are lost 
and no other institutional actor is likely to address the issue. Similarly, 
redistributions of power away from city councils to other institutional actors 
may be appropriate if those other actors have greater institutional competence 
or can better balance the competing needs of city residents and other parties 
affected by a particular exercise of power, but may raise countervailing concerns 
about decisions being made by institutions that are less accountable to city 
residents.  
The challenge is translating these abstract concerns into an analytical tool 
to assess the normative desirability of part-time city councils. This Part suggests 
that one way to do so is to think about the factors that lend legitimacy to city 
councils as decision-makers, as well as considerations that cut against the 
entity’s institutional legitimacy. Part IV.A proposes a set of normative 
guideposts that can help us assess the power of city councils, by unpacking 
factors that enhance or detract from a city council’s institutional legitimacy. Part 
IV.B applies these guideposts to assess the normative desirability of the part-
time model in different types of cities and reflects on other lessons that emerge 
from this Article’s analysis. 
A. Assessing City Councils as Decision-Makers  
Determining whether the power dynamics associated with the part-time 
model are normatively desirable requires grappling with the question of how 
much power a city council should have. There are no simple answers to this 
question. It depends in part on one’s view of the role of city councils: Are they 
more likely to be sites of small-scale civic engagement and valuable laboratories 
of democracy, or sources of unnecessary layers of government regulation, prone 
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to policymaking that imposes spillovers and undercuts statewide uniformity 
concerns? It also depends on one’s view of council members: Are they uniquely 
well-positioned to act on matters of local import, or are they likely to be well-
intentioned but underqualified, drawn from a limited pool of candidates, with 
conflicts of interest due to outside employment?  
The question of how much power a city council should have—and how 
institutional design can be used to calibrate council’s power—is further 
complicated because of the multi-dimensional power dynamics at play in city 
governance, from state-local to intra-local to inter-local and public-private. As 
a result, there invariably will be tensions in how much power we want city 
councils to have.261 For example, a less powerful city council might mitigate 
concerns we might have about city power in one context or with respect to one 
other institutional actor, but aggravate concerns we might have about lack of 
city power in another context or with respect to another institutional actor.  
While further empirical study might prove fruitful for investigating possible 
correlations between metrics of power and specific characteristics of cities—for 
example, cities of at least W population, with X form of government, and Y type 
of city councils produce Z% more welfare-enhancing policies than other types 
of cities—we are unlikely to be able to reduce questions of city council power 
to a simple formula. However, there are other metrics we can draw on to inform 
institutional design decisions about city government. In this Part, I suggest that 
by thinking more deeply about factors that lend legitimacy to city councils as 
decision-making entities, as well as factors that cut against their legitimacy, we 
can develop a set of normative guideposts about the values served by city 
councils as decision-makers, which can in turn be used to judge the extent to 
which different institutional design arrangements, such as the part-time model, 
serve those values. 
1. Legitimacy-Enhancing Features of City Councils 
Representation of Diversity of Interests. Unlike executive officials who act 
as individuals, legislatures act collectively: when a legislature enacts policy—
whether through the passage of individual laws, the approval of a budget, or the 
creation of an administration agency—it is the result of the collective decision-
making of all members of that body.262 While collective decision-making has 
 
 261 See YATES, supra note 27, at 34–36 (discussing the multi-dimensional nature of city 
governance as “street-fighting pluralism,” which he defines as a “pattern of unstructured, 
multilateral conflict in which many different combatants fight continuously with one another 
in a very great number of permutations and combinations”). 
 262 See SQUIRE & MONCRIEF, supra note 10, at 169 (discussing the representational role 
of state legislators). This statement obviously oversimplifies the actual practice of 
lawmaking in legislatures, which is shaped by internal procedural rules, committees, 
coalition building, logrolling, and other dynamics that have the result of making laws enacted 
by legislatures and not the result of collective decision-making by all members of the 
legislature. The general statement is used here simply to make a comparative point about the 
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its drawbacks—it can be slow-moving and prone to deadlock, and the 
compromises that emerge may be unsatisfying—its great advantage is the ability 
for a diversity of interests to be represented. City councils are “the one 
institution designed to serve as the collective voice of residents and 
communities” in cities.263 Members of councils represent different interests 
across the entire city; particularly when members are elected by a district or in 
a hybrid system, they can give voice to the competing concerns of 
neighborhoods or particular groups.264 Vesting city councils with relatively 
more power as decision-makers ideally produces local policies that benefit the 
city as a whole, but that must also take into account the needs of different 
neighborhoods and competing preferences of different groups.265 The risk of 
such a model, of course, is deadlock over compromise or deference to the 
preferences of a particular neighborhood or interest group over the needs of the 
city as a whole.266 In contrast, if other decision-makers have more power—such 
as the mayor—they can offer a single unifying voice representing citywide 
interests, but potentially at the cost of representation of a diversity of sub-local 
interests.267 
Democratic Accountability. Unlike many of the other institutions that might 
make decisions about city policy—such as city managers, appointed boards and 
commissions, governing bodies of special districts, and private actors—city 
councils are directly accountable to voters. Thus, vesting relatively more power 
in city councils, as compared to these other actors, provides voters with an 
 
how the structure of city councils, as compared with other decision-makers, allows for a 
representation of diversity of interests. 
 263 See Gurwitt, supra note 207. 
 264 See MacManus, supra note 15, at 169 (“Proponents of mixed systems promote them 
precisely because they retain some council members who bring a citywide perspective to 
matters before the council but allow other councilors to represent more narrow neighborhood 
or group perspectives.”). The size of city councils also affects the extent to which diversity 
of interests are represented and how effectively they are represented in terms of number of 
constituents per members. See City Councils, supra note 86 (“While the number of 
councilmen is proportional to the population of the municipality, there is no national standard 
of proportion. In addition, the size of a council may reflect the complexity of services 
provided, the council’s workload, the diversity and size of the population, the political 
dynamics and preferences of the city.”). City council sizes range widely (from five to fifty-
one), as do ratios of constituents per member. See id. 
 265 See MacManus, supra note 15, at 166 (noting that city councils have evolved from 
“homogeneous, consensual, part-time and deferential to mayors and city managers” to “more 
diverse, conflictual, and even more defiant of chief executives”); Svara, Embattled Mayors, 
supra note 27, at 155 (finding that “council members are more diverse in their characteristics, 
more activist in their orientation”). 
 266 See MORE THAN MAYOR OR MANAGER, supra note 15, at 14 (noting critiques of the 
council-manager form of government are that “city council is prone to dissension; no one 
can overcome dissension on the city council,” and that there are “too many masters [which] 
brings diffusion of power, accountability”). 
 267 See id. 
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institution to hold accountable for policymaking successes or failures in the next 
election.268 
Local Autonomy. The more power held by city councils, particularly vis-à-
vis the state, the more local autonomy is enhanced, since policies reflecting the 
needs and preferences of local residents are more likely to be enacted.269 
Whether we want cities to have more autonomy, of course, is a highly contested 
question, as evidenced by extensive scholarly debates over the scope of home 
rule, preemption, and other state-local conflicts.270 But particularly where the 
needs or preferences of city residents differ from those of residents statewide 
and do not adversely impact disadvantaged groups, and where there are limited 
spillover effects of local variation in policymaking, local autonomy would seem 
to be value worth preserving. Furthermore, while high-profile local activism 
such as sanctuary city policies garner headlines,271 more often than not, city 
councils enact policy not to intentionally challenge state or federal state law, but 
to fill in gaps left by the inaction of higher levels of government. For example, 
the city council of Laredo, Texas, did not pass an ordinance to ban single-use 
plastic bags because it was looking for a fight with the state legislatures, but 
because littered plastic bags were clogging stormwater drains, imposing costs 
on local residents, and no other level of government was taking action on the 
issue.272  
2. Legitimacy-Diminishing Features of City Councils 
Efficiency. The flip side of the accountability and representativeness of any 
legislative body is a loss of efficiency: when decisions must be made 
 
 268 See Anne Mette Kjaer, Governance and the Urban Bureaucracy, in THEORIES OF 
URBAN POLITICS, supra note 29, at 143 (“[I]dentifying power becomes more complex and 
therefore, holding the exercises of power responsible through institutions of public 
accountability is rendered more of a challenge.”). 
 269 See SVARA, TWO DECADES, supra note 15, at 29–30. 
 270 The literature on this topic is vast. See, e.g., Nestor Davidson, The Dilemma of 
Localism in an Era of Polarization, 128 YALE L.J. 954, 958 (2019). Mr. Davidson 
summarized the basic problem of local autonomy eloquently: “After all, as much as local 
governments can advance economic fairness, social justice, and policy innovation, they 
can—and often do—use their power as a tool of exclusion, reinforcing racial and 
socioeconomic inequality. This is the double-edged sword of localism: local empowerment 
can be used for desirable as well as pernicious ends.” Id. 
 271 See, e.g., Macias, supra note 224. 
 272 See Chuck Lindell, Cities Can’t Ban Plastic Bags, Rules Texas Supreme Court, 
GOVERNING STATES & LOCALITIES (June 26, 2018), https://www.governing.com/ 
topics/transportation-infrastructure/tns-plastic-bag-ban-texas-supreme-court.html 
[https://perma.cc/JV69-F6CA] (“[C]ity officials . . . argued that bag bans are essential to 
managing litter—a goal that protects animals, saves cleanup costs and limits damage to 
clogged sewers and drains.”). 
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collectively, it almost invariably takes longer to reach agreement.273 The loss of 
efficiency not only means that decisions may take longer to make, but also that 
the decision-making process may end up being more expensive and 
contentious.274 Vesting power in alternative institutions, whether a local 
executive who does not face the challenge of collective decision-making or a 
special purpose government with an appointed board not directly accountable to 
voters, can make for more streamlined and efficient decision-making.  
Need for Expertise. Individuals elected to city council are almost always 
generalists with regard to the responsibilities of their role as council 
members.275 Individual members may have particular expertise from their own 
education or employment that they can draw on with regard to some issues that 
come before them; for example, a small business owner serving on city council 
may have particular insights regarding business licensing programs, and a 
lawyer may be able to contribute specialized knowledge with regard to a range 
of legal issues. However, council members are not specialists in the sense that 
career employees in the city planning department or sanitation department are 
with regard to the responsibilities of their jobs, nor in the sense of being trained 
professionals in the management of government, which most city managers 
are.276 And unlike the leadership of special districts, which focus on a single or 
limited set of government activities, such as flood control or fire protection, 
members of city councils deal with a range of service-related and policy 
concerns, from planning to infrastructure to economic development to 
coordination with federal and state governments on a multitude of issues.277 
Thus, if we want decisions to be made by institutions that have specific types of 
expertise on particular issues, then arguably city councils are less well-
positioned to do so than other actors, such as professional staff or appointed 
administrative bodies.278 
Tendency Towards Fragmentation. While a more powerful city council 
promotes the value of local autonomy, it also creates a greater risk that the 
council will exercise that power in ways that may have spillover effects on those 
outside the city’s boundaries. Metropolitan regions are often made up of 
dozens—or even hundreds—of individual municipalities, which each have a 
 
 273 See Crystal Lombardo, 17 Advantages and Disadvantages of Group Decision 
Making, FUTURE WORKING, https://futureofworking.com/5-advantages-and-disadvantages-
of-group-decision-making/ [https://perma.cc/K6MY-ZYSV]. 
 274 See id. 
 275 See generally SVARA, TWO DECADES, supra note 15. 
 276 See Local Government Management: A Career Overview, ICMA, https://icma 
.org/local-government-management-career-overview [https://perma.cc/4KLY-Z3X5] 
(indicating that two-thirds of city, town, and county managers have an MPA or other 
advanced degree). 
 277 See City Councils, supra note 86. 
 278 In an informal discussion with the author, one municipal lawyer said “[t]hank God” 
for special districts, suggesting that if all of the governing duties that special districts are 
responsible for were left to part-time city councils, the results would be troubling, to say the 
least. 
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local legislative body vested with similar formal legal authority under state law 
to engage in the provision of services and police power regulations. The 
spillover problems that result from this fragmented decision-making have been 
the subject of extensive scholarly interest, particularly in the context of land 
use.279 While the problem of metropolitan fragmentation is the result of far more 
powerful forces than just the institutional design of local legislatures,280 the 
well-documented tendency of city councils to make and engage in policymaking 
with minimal regard to the impacts of those decisions on neighboring 
communities or the region as a whole cuts against their legitimacy as decision-
makers.281  
Electoral Disinterest. Numerous scholarly accounts and empirical studies 
have documented consistent patterns showing both a lack of competition and 
low turnout in local government elections.282 In light of this situation, where 
council seats are often uncontested and electoral turnout is in the single digits, 
the legitimacy of council as a representative democratic institution and the 
accountability of elected officials may be called into question.283 Other 
institutional actors that attract more civic engagement, such as mayors, may 
have a better claim to representative legitimacy and thus may be a preferable 
situs of institutional power.284 
 
 279 See STERK ET AL., supra note 172, at 725–27, 734–38. 
 280 An enormous amount of literature discusses the problem of metropolitan 
fragmentation and spillover effects of local decision-making. Id. at 737 (cataloguing some 
of this literature). 
 281 See OLIVER, supra note 150, at 211 (“[C]urrent arrangements and legal standing give 
almost supreme power to municipalities and set them in dysfunctional competition with each 
other. The structure of local government law basically treats municipalities as isolated actors 
and gives them few incentives to cooperate with each other.”). 
 282 See, e.g., David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council 
Elections?: The Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419, 419–24 (2007) (citing data on the 
lack of competition in city council elections and suggesting that the lack of competition may 
in part be the result of lack of partisan signals in many local elections).  
 283 See id. at 468 (“Mayoral elections, especially those in big cities, produce the type of 
electoral froth—news media coverage, campaign spending—that can help voters overcome 
the informational problems they face as a result of not having an accurate party heuristic. 
City councils do not. As such, to the extent that cities are making decisions about the 
allocation of political power between a local legislature and a local executive, and care about 
the extent to which officials are representative of the views of locals, they should grant more 
power to mayors, and less to councils.”). 
 284 See id.; see also KAUFMANN, supra note 71, at 13 (“Because the mayor is generally 
the most visible local official, mayoral elections are typically more salient than other forms 
of local elections.”); U.S. VOTE FOUND., FIXING THE PROBLEM OF LOW VOTER TURNOUT IN 
US LOCAL ELECTIONS: A DATA-DRIVEN SOLUTION 8 (2017), https://www.usvote 
foundation.org/sites/default/files/US_Vote_LOCelections_Whitepaper.pdfhttps://ww
w.usvotefoundation.org/sites/default/files/US_Vote_LOCelections_Whitepaper.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/WM5P-6YKR] (“Different forms of local governance can also elicit 
different levels of turnout. Prof. [Neil] Caren’s [University of Michigan professor] research 
has shown that elections for city council that appoint a council manager as the chief executive 
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By unpacking the factors that lend legitimacy to city councils as decision-
makers, as well as considerations that cut against their legitimacy, this Part 
offers a set of normative guideposts for thinking about local legislative power. 
It should be acknowledged that this is an abstract and highly simplified account 
that intentionally omits a range of broader considerations about local 
governance. For example, the same factors that enhance the legitimacy of city 
councils may also enhance the legitimacy of other institutional actors: 
democratic accountability can be effectuated not only by a full-time city council, 
but also through other elected officials, such as mayors and state lawmakers. 
And there are other institutional design features, such as the status of the mayor 
as a strong mayor or weak mayor, or whether a council-manager or mayor-
council form of government is used, as well as idiosyncratic factors—such as 
the personalities of those serving in office and the political environment in 
which they are operating—that can affect the legitimacy of city councils as 
decision-makers.  
But by excluding other variables, this framework allows us to more clearly 
recognize a set of normative criteria by which to judge the part-time model. If 
we want to prioritize efficiency and expertise, and to provide a check against 
metropolitan fragmentation and electoral disinterest, then a part-time city 
council would seem to be a rational institutional design choice: the fact that 
power may be unexercised by a part-time council or redistributed to other 
institutional actors who better serve these values is a normatively desirable 
outcome. Conversely, if we are more concerned with local decision-making 
reflecting values of democratic accountability, representing a diversity of 
interests, and enhancing local autonomy, then a part-time city council is more 
problematic, since it may result in a power vacuum and redistribution of power 
away from the very institution that can effectuate those values. The next Part 
considers the implications of this analysis. 
B. Implications of the Analysis 
The framework developed in the preceding discussion provides a valuable 
theoretical account of how the internal structures of city councils affect the 
distribution of power in governance systems. But the framework also has 
practical import. Part III.2.A reflects on the implications of this Article’s 
analysis and suggests that three key insights emerge. 
First, applying this Article’s framework allows us to respond to the question 
posed at the outset: Is part-time government in cities a problem? The answer, as 
it is so often in the legal context, is it depends. In particular, it depends on what 
type of city we are talking about. For the majority of cities—which, as noted in 
Part I.A, are small, homogeneous places that most would refer to as a suburb or 
small town—applying the normative guideposts above suggests that the part-
 
of the city tend to have a 7.5 percent lower turnout than cities with a ‘strong mayor’ form of 
government.”). 
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time model is in fact an appropriate institutional design choice. By redistributing 
power away from city councils in these types of cities, the part-time model 
provides a check on spillover effects associated with excessive municipal 
fragmentation, which is one of the more vexing problems facing metropolitan 
regions today.285 While it does so at the cost of sacrificing local autonomy that 
might be served by a more powerful full-time city council, local autonomy is 
not an unmitigated good. Experience has shown that local autonomy, 
particularly local autonomy of small, homogenous municipalities, is often 
exercised in an exclusionary fashion that imposes externalities on neighboring 
cities or the region as a whole:286 one need only look at the seemingly intractable 
problem of affordable housing to see how incremental decision-making by 
elected leaders of small, autonomous municipalities can lead to a significant 
policy problem.287 Particularly because state law typically grants equivalent 
formal legal powers to cities of the same class, regardless of whether they have 
a thousand or hundreds of thousands of residents,288 institutional design 
arrangements like a part-time city council may thus indirectly mitigate the 
effects of fragmentation. In the land use context, for example, the NIMBYism 
(Not In My Backyard) of Mt. Laurel in the 1980s,289 or affluent suburbs of 
 
 285 See, e.g., Wayne Batchis, Urban Sprawl and the Constitution: Education Inequity as 
an Impetus to Low Density Living, 42 URB. LAW. 95, 98 (2010) (discussing the impact of 
municipal fragmentation on educational inequity); Kellen Zale, Local Government 
Formation and Boundary Change in Texas: A Post-Harvey Assessment, 8 HLRE: OFF REC. 
105, 118 (2018) (discussing the impact of municipal fragmentation on regional flood 
mitigation efforts); Emily Badger, What Happens When a Metropolitan Area Has Too Many 
Governments, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/  
wonk/wp/2015/02/18/what-happens-when-a-metropolitan-area-has-way-too-many-
governments/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.58bebd2937df  [https://perma.cc/5TUW-
UWWE] (discussing the connections between the policing problems in St. Louis and the 
events of Ferguson and the metropolitan fragmentation of the region). 
 286 See STERK ET AL., supra note 172, at 727–37 (discussing cases involving this problem 
in the land use context). 
 287 See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. Livermore, 557 
P.2d 473, 494 (Cal. 1976) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (“[M]ay [the city of] Livermore build a 
Chinese Wall to insulate itself from growth problems today? And if Livermore may do so, 
why not every municipality in Alameda County and all other counties in Northern 
California?”). 
 288 As discussed in Part II.A, state law often distinguishes between home rule and non-
home rule cities, with the former typically having more extensive legal authority than the 
latter. See supra Part II.A. State law also often creates classes of cities by population or 
geographic size, and may allot differing legal authority to cities of different classes. See City 
and Town Classification, MRSC, http://mrsc.org/getdoc/9ffdd05f-965a-4737-b421-
ac4f8749b721/City-and-Town-Classification-Overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/839J-
LXLQ]. 
 289 See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount 
Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of 
Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II) 456 A.2d 390, 415 (N.J. 1983) (holding that municipalities 
must use their zoning powers to provide low- and moderate-income residents with a realistic 
opportunity to afford housing). 
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Northern California today,290 might have been worse if those cities had full-time 
city councils intent on exercising their power to restrict affordable housing.  
Furthermore, although the part-time model sacrifices to a certain degree 
values of democratic accountability and representation of diverse interests, the 
positive features of many cities make these values less salient. As noted above, 
most cities are small places, and most small places are internally homogeneous 
in terms of demographics and socioeconomic characteristics of residents.291 
Contrary to the image of a city as a major urban center with large and diverse 
populations and interests groups, many cities in fact look much more like a 
private association.292 And that is often the precise goal of municipal 
incorporation: to produce a shift in power that serves private interests, while at 
the same time gaining the designation of municipal corporation and the formal 
legal powers granted to such entities under state law.293 As the political scientist 
Eric Oliver has noted: “By creating affluent, homogeneous communities that are 
politically separated from the larger and more diverse metropolitan economy, 
affluent suburban municipalities effectively distance their residents from the 
problems and conflicts of the greater economy on which they depend.”294 While 
not every small, homogenous city is intent on passing exclusionary zoning 
ordinances,295 in light of the more private-facing, associational nature of many 
 
 290 See, e.g., Marisa Kendall, State Threatens to Sue Cupertino over Housing Policy, 
MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/08/05/state-
threatens-to-sue-cupertino-over-housing-policy/?utm_campaign=SDU&utm_source= 
hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=75519178&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--1X4bX 
UIesV7XaJIkvd1FTigPEszx9sH3Qrt_6D4-piLgF4WIIyU86a7ZN30nSrCbrr3P1L33t  
d2D-Pt6_wj2uFStZvQ&_hsmi=75519178 [https://perma.cc/HCS7-7RDG] (describing 
a potential lawsuit by the state of California against Cupertino, which is “often criticized by 
activists over a perceived reluctance to build homes,” to satisfy its housing obligations under 
state law); Kristen Sze & Jennifer Olney, Bay Area Housing Crisis: Many Bay Area Small 
Towns Caught Between Pro-Housing Advocates and Residents Who Do Not Want Change, 
ABC 7 NEWS (Aug. 6, 2019), https://abc7news.com/society/bay-area-towns-caught-
between-pro-housing-advocates-residents-against-change/5438316/ [https://perma.cc 
/H57T-Z8P4] (reporting on the Bay Area housing crisis). 
 291 See OLIVER, supra note 150, at 84 (“Communities with internally homogenous 
political desires have little need for high levels of civic activity because their residents’ 
preferences are so easily represented . . . . Any citizen can easily speak for the whole, and 
citizen concerns can be represented by the most minimal of civic actions.”). 
 292 See id. 
 293 See BURNS, supra note 250, at 5 (noting that the process of creating local 
governments is a political one that is “time consuming, prone to failure, and expensive,” that 
“only certain individuals and certain kinds of groups will have the interest and resources 
necessary to succeed in these formation efforts,” and that when new cities are incorporated, 
the values embedded in the new institutions tend to be exclusionary instead of participatory). 
 294 See OLIVER, supra note 150, at 96. 
 295 The city councils (and citizens) of some small, relatively homogenous municipalities 
in fact have been at the forefront of enacting innovative and progressive local ordinances. 
See generally SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 206. 
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such cities, the fact that their part-time city councils result in power going 
unexercised may be an indirect benefit of the part-time model.296  
However, a second insight of this Article’s framework is that for a limited 
subset of cities—particularly mid-sized and larger cities that have experienced 
population growth and changing demographics, and an associated greater 
number and complexity of policy problems for lawmakers to respond to, but 
whose internal governance structures have remained unchanged—a part-time 
city council is more problematic. In these types of cities, there is more likely to 
be a significant diversity of interests that a part-time council may be under-
equipped to serve: “The problems large cities face tend to be more complex, 
more interrelated, and more difficult to handle. As a consequence of these 
conditions, the political environment of the large city is highly charged.”297 
There is not only a wider range of interests in large cities, but also a greater 
capacity of interest groups to form and organize, in part due to higher levels of 
media attention on city government in these cities.298  
Particularly when a city council is part-time and the mayor is full-time, there 
may be internal redistributions of power that diminish the extent that diverse 
constituent interests are taken into account in city decision-making. In such 
situations, the mayor—who is electorally accountable to the entire population 
of the city—is more likely to focus on acting in the economic interests of the 
city as a whole, rather than the interests of neighborhoods or constituencies 
whose priorities diverge from city-wide ones.299 Although in theory, welfare-
maximizing outcomes should result, in practice, it may mean certain groups or 
neighborhoods are systematically disadvantaged.300 While moving from a less 
 
 296 The nearly inevitable commingling of public and private interests is heightened in 
these types of cities because of the limited pool of candidates (due to the smaller population) 
and the need for conflict of interest rules that are flexible enough to allow council members 
to serve (and vote) while retaining outside employment. Such heightened commingling also 
favors the diminished power of a part-time city council. See Fasano v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 
507 P.2d 23, 26 (Or. 1973) (“Local and small decision groups are simply not the equivalent 
in all respects of state and national legislatures.”). 
 297 MORE THAN MAYOR OR MANAGER, supra note 15, at 9 (“Large cities do not 
necessarily provide a broader range of functions than smaller cities, but they certainly take 
on a wider array of activities and are more likely to introduce innovations that may prove to 
be controversial.”). 
 298 See id. at 8–9. 
 299 Some scholars have also suggested that concentrating more power in the mayor may 
result in less progressive legislation being passed because of the fact most mayors have an 
outsized interest in maintaining a “pro-business” climate. See Jacob Alderdice, Impeding 
Local Laboratories: Obstacles to Urban Policy Diffusion in Local Government Law, 7 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 459, 468 (2013) (“The modern strength of the mayoralty has 
produced some extremes in blocking council legislation, and New York City Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg, as perhaps the representative of the modern strong mayor, is at the forefront.”). 
 300 See McGregor, supra note 196 (“Perhaps in the 1960s and ’70s, when Spokane was 
a less complicated place with challenges that had simpler solutions, part-time council 
members were more than enough. But today, in a city that is swimming upstream against 
just about every issue it faces . . . Spokane clearly needs all the help it can get.”). 
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powerful, part-time council to a more powerful, full-time council could tip the 
scale too far in the other direction (by overemphasizing neighborhood-specific 
interests at a cost to interests of the city as a whole), other institutional design 
levers—such as a strong mayor system, elimination of aldermanic 
prerogative,301 and use of mixed at-large and ward-based council seats—can be 
utilized to guard against such concerns. 
The continued use of the part-time model in mid-sized and larger cities also 
potentially undercuts the value of local autonomy in ways that are not offset by 
the check on spillover effects. Both large and small municipalities may use their 
legal authority in ways that impose negative externalities on neighboring 
communities or the region at large—particularly in the context of fiscal zoning 
and exclusionary housing policies. However, larger cities, while not immune 
from imposing negative externalities on their neighbors, also have a track record 
of using their legal authority in ways that create positive externalities that 
benefit neighboring communities, such as public transportation services that 
ease congestion throughout the region, or minimum wage laws that make it 
possible for lower income workers to afford to stay in the community and 
provide services that neighboring areas rely on. While some mid-sized and 
larger cities with part-time councils have enacted innovative, positive 
externality-producing policies, the fact that they have done so with a part-time 
council begs the question of how much more they could do were the council 
full-time. 
Identifying which of the eleven out of every twelve cities currently utilizing 
the part-time model are most likely to suffer adverse distributional impacts from 
power unexercised or redistributed is an endeavor for future scholarship. But 
this Article’s analysis demonstrates that for some significant number of mid-
sized and larger cities, with internal governance structures that have remained 
unchanged for decades and that are misaligned to their current needs due to 
population growth and demographic changes, the power dynamics associated 
with the part-time model are problematic.302 This is not to say that 
considerations about the redistributions of power associated with the part-time 
model should be the only factor taken into account in debates about institutional 
design reforms: the city’s fiscal health, competing policy preferences of 
residents, and consideration of other institutional design levers—such as form 
of government and strong mayor versus weak mayor status—are likely to 
dominate discussions in cities that are considering a shift from the part-time to 
 
 301 The term “aldermanic privilege” refers to the power of city council members to 
initiate or block legislation specifically concerning their own wards, associated most 
significantly with Chicago. See Christopher Thale, Aldermanic Privilege, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
CHI., http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/2197.html  [https://perma.cc/ 
XJB7-S64W]. 
 302 See MORE THAN MAYOR OR MANAGER, supra note 15, at 9 (explaining that “growth 
itself generates conflict and questions about purpose and direction of the city” and “may 
produce a demand for change not just in the occupants of public office but also in the 
structure of those offices”). 
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full-time model.303 But recognizing the adverse effects of the power dynamics 
of the part-time model may change the calculus about the continued desirability 
of the part-time model as an institutional design choice in some cities.304  
Finally, the analysis herein contributes to—and complicates—ongoing 
scholarly debate about state-local relations. In light of the growing volume and 
punitive nature of state preemption of local government actions over the past 
decade, a number of scholars have explored possible legal and political reforms 
that might respond to the increasingly aggressive posture of states towards 
cities.305 Assuming one agrees with these proposed reforms, the analysis herein 
suggests that we need to be mindful about whether the internal structures of 
cities as currently configured allow for them to meaningfully engage in such 
efforts. While cities with robust internal governance structures—such as those 
with a full-time city council or a strong mayor or both—may have the 
organizational architecture to support the development of legal or policy tools 
to respond to state preemption, the institutional design arrangements in other 
cities may limit their capacity to fully engage in these efforts.306 
 
 303 See Hibbing, supra note 122, at 40 (noting that even if all subjective disagreements 
disappeared and everyone agreed a more institutionalized legislative entity were desirable, 
“If the constitutional arrangements and general tenor of a society are not conducive to 
legislative institutionalization, it should not be forced onto a system . . . . [Since a]n overly 
‘viable’ legislature in a system not equipped to handle one may be a bad prescription.”). 
 304 However, it is worth emphasizing that simply making structural changes won’t 
necessarily make the people that fill particular elected roles “better” or make government 
work “better.” See Ehrenhalt, supra note 57 (“In a great many cities, ‘reform’ is always going 
to consist of whatever system hasn’t been tried there lately. ‘What you really need,’ says 
Terrell Blodgett, an eminent public administration scholar and an adviser to El Paso, ‘is a 
strong mayor, a strong council and a strong city manager. But that’s easier said than done.’”); 
see also MORE THAN MAYOR OR MANAGER, supra note 15, at 305 (“[S]hortcomings in city 
government lead some to want a change from whatever form they’ve got to a different 
structure.”). 
 305 See, e.g., Schragger, American Cities, supra note 73, at 1216–32 (discussing legal 
and political options available to cities in responding to state-local conflicts); Sarah Swan, 
Plaintiff Cities, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1227, 1233 (2018) (discussing the value of plaintiff cities 
as “establishing themselves as entities responsible for and capable of achieving justice for 
their populations”); Nadav Shoked, Cities Taxing New Sins: The Judicial Embrace of Local 
Excise Taxation, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 801, 805 (2018) (“Excise taxes are a potent tool in the 
hands of cities seeking to pursue, or to make a statement regarding, social and economic 
goals, particularly those that are hotly contested.”); Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the 
New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995, 1995 (2018) (examining “the spread of the new 
preemption and explor[ing] the legal doctrines available to local governments for 
challenging it”). 
 306 See, e.g., Clarence N. Stone, Local Citizens and the Political Order of Cities, in 
THEORIES OF URBAN POLITICS 257, 264 (Jonathan S. Davies & David L. Imbroscio eds., 
2009) (“Since change is not readily achieved by pulling a single lever, mobilising for change 
is likely to be beyond the capacity of those who are lightly resourced.”). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored how a single institutional design choice—part-
time city councils—has systematic implications for city power. By developing 
a taxonomy of how the part-time model can both produce power vacuums and 
redistribute power, as well as advancing a normative argument about the 
institutional legitimacy of city councils, this Article makes a novel contribution 
to local government literature and provides a framework to clarify and refine 
our intuitions about the connections between institutional design and city power. 
While this Article seeks to draw attention to the understudied impacts of 
internal structures on the distribution of power in governance systems, I do not 
suggest that these impacts should be the only criteria in local government 
institutional design decisions. Nor do I suggest that institutional design is the 
most important determinant of power dynamics in governance. Other factors, 
such as background principles of state law and market forces, have just as much 
or more salience in shaping power relationships. But by exploring the power 
dynamics associated with part-time city councils, the account offered here aims 
to foster a more doctrinally complete and civically productive dialogue about 
local government institutional design, as well as to engage with scholars, 
policymakers, and citizens in thinking about more deeply about the policy 
implications of organizational structures in our cities. 
